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ABSTRACT
On March 20th, 2003 the US lead a “Coalition of the Willing” to invade Iraq.
While the initial phase of the war lasted only until the 1st of May, the follow-
ing occupation continued until the withdrawal of the US military in December
2011. During the occupation the US and coalition forces relied heavily on pri-
vate militarised security companies (PMSCs), which drew from a large pool of
Third Country Nationals (TCNs) for their operations in the non-combat area.
The TCNs came from low income countries, mainly from the so called “Global
South”. Most of them were employed in catering or facility maintenance, yet
others worked in the security area, guarding military bases, checkpoints or
sensitive infrastructure. The thesis’ focus are these ‘armed TCNs’ and the na-
tional distribution within this heterogenous group. Thus, the research ques-
tion is: How can the national distribution among ’armed TCNs’ in the US-lead
private security sector in Iraq be explained? The possible answers are con-
densed to four hypotheses that each emphasise influential aspects focusing
on: economic considerations, political conditions, the historical-structural set-
ting, and military reputation and qualifications. These four are tested to their
explanatory value by means of a comparative examination of three national
groups: Chileans, Fijians and Ugandans. From this examination emerges that
even though a complex entanglement of various factors influenced all of these
recruitments, there are some case specific characteristics. The Chilean presence
among TCNs in Iraq can be attributed largely to the countries history with the
US and its military reputation. In the Fijian case all four aspects played an im-
portant role and with regard to Uganda, mainly economic and political reasons
were identified as decisive.
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1
INTRODUCT ION
The early debates on private security involvement in the Iraq occupation since
2003 focused on high profile cases such as that of the US company Blackwater.
Over the past years awareness has spread that behind this prominent exam-
ple lay a more subtle landscape of privatised security. People from all over
the globe have been drawn in the thousands to Iraq to earn their living in a
war zone that had become a thriving business environment. The images of
Chileans, Fijians and Ugandans, labelled in the title of this thesis as “profes-
sional”, “reliable” and “affordable” are somewhat caricatural, but stem from
the analysis of how and why these national groups were working as private
security contractors in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. This thesis will trace the
circumstances under which these people started working as contractors abroad
in a war that seemed far removed from their home countries.
The introductory chapter will lay a broad and solid foundation for the thesis.
In the following, the background leading to this transnational recruitment will
be described, thereafter the relevant scholarly literature will be presented and
eventually the academic parameters of this thesis will be spelled out.
1.1 the “coalition of the willing” and its willing workforce
In 2003 the “Coalition of the Willing”1 led by the United States of America (US)
invaded Iraq. “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was officially initiated to find and de-
fang weapons of mass destruction. The actual existence of these weapons was
and remains highly disputed. The regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown,
regardless. US President George W. Bush declared victory on the 1st of May
2003, only 41 days after the invasion. This was succeeded by an occupation that
lasted until December 2011. During this phase the US Department of Defense
(DoD) contracted private companies for services formerly provided in-house.
Tasks ranging from logistics and mission support to actual involvement in com-
bat activities were carried out by these private militarised security companies
(PMSCs)2. Similar contracts were given out by the US Department of State
(DoS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) for security
provision. Over the past decades it has become commonplace for embassies,
businesses and even humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to
buy private security (Perrin, 2012; Duffield, 2012). In Iraq the DoD alone em-
ployed almost as many contractors3 as troops (Schwartz, 2009, 5). Many of
the influential PMSCs were based in the US, yet a significant portion of their
staff came from third party countries, which means they were neither from a
1 This label has been used as well in other contexts, but will refer throughout the thesis to the US
initiative in the context of the 2003 war in Iraq.
2 This term is taken from Paul Higate (2012b). It highlights that even though most of these com-
panies provide non-combat security they often acquire a paramilitary habitus. Especially in a
war zone like Iraq, even simple guarding tasks become embedded in a military realm.
3 The term contractor refers to the individual working for a private military or security company,
but can also be used for the companies.
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country of the coalition forces, nor from Iraq. These Third Country Nationals
(TCNs) came largely from low income countries of the “Global South”4.
Total US citizens TCNs Local Nationals
Number 132.610 36.061 60.244 36.305
Percentage 27% 45% 27%
Table 1.1.1: DoD Contractor personnel in Iraq (March 2009)
In 2009 60.244 of 132.610 DoD contractors in Iraq - 45% - were TCNs (Schwartz,
2009, 7). Many worked in the so called non-combat sector5. They worked in
restaurants, laundry and the service industry within the military compounds.
Some were employed in the actual security sector, guarding compounds, mili-
tary and industrial installations. They took care of security on the US military
bases internally and externally, but were also involved in securing convoys
and details as well as secure transport logistics. Even though none of these
tasks were considered part of the combat area, the contractors were still re-
quired to use arms. I will refer to this particular group as ’armed TCNs’. They
are of particular interest here. The majority of them were made up of over
10.000 Ugandans (Ahimbisibwe, 2008); but also 1.100 Peruvians (del Prado,
2008c), about 3.000 Fijians (Teaiwa, 2008) and roughly 750 Chileans (del Prado,
2008a) as well as individuals frommany other countries were employed. In this
multinational private security workforce most nationalities were represented
to some extent. Significant amounts of people were, however, from a more
limited range of countries. As the private industry started its heavy engage-
ment in Iraq most of their contractors had a special operations background
and were coming from the US, United Kingdom (UK), Western Europe, Aus-
tralia or South Africa6. These seem to be the obvious first choices7, especially
with regard to South Africans. This group has been associated with a back-
ground in the Apartheid security services and acquired a reputation through
their involvement in the 1990s in Sierra Leone and Angola (Reno, 1997). As
the security situation improved and less specialised personnel was needed,
companies started hiring Fijians, Chileans and Nepalese “Gurkhas”. Later in
2005 and 2006 it was realised that even less qualifications were needed. The
companies recruited mainly according to cost effectiveness, turning to Latin
4 The term “Global South” refers as much to a historically grown imagination, projected onto
certain actors and appropriated by themselves, as to a materiality that has emerged through and
in interaction with these images. It is therefore used in quotation marks to show a respective
awareness.
5 Divided by the type of service, 56% of contractor personnel was involved with base support, 19%
with construction and 8% with security, the remaining tasks were translation, transportation,
communication and others. For a graphical overview, see appendix A.1.1.
6 This group of contractors was referred to as ’expats’, while the later recruited and less well
trained contractors working for lower wages were labelled as ’TCN’. As Guy Raz (2007) re-
marked: “they might as well be called third-world nationals”. Even though he is referring more
to the TCN employed in the ’domestic’ non-combat area, taking care of catering and cleaning,
he points to a prevalent division of labour. In how far colonial, Cold War or other global divides
influence this choice of terminology would be worthwhile to examine.
7 It is noteworthy that there were very few Israelis involved. According to an industry insider the
US and later the Iraqi government would not allow for the presence of Israeli passport holders,
in fear of the problems that may be caused due to religious differences.
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American countries like Peru, Colombia, Honduras and Ecuador as well as to
regular Nepalese and other Asian nationals. Eventually Ugandans were discov-
ered to be very suitable for employment. Later Kenyans and Sierra Leoneans
were also recruited. African TCNs played a large role in static security posi-
tions, while in the mobile security, which was assumed to need a higher level
of military training, the replacement of expats evolved slower. Over time these
positions became occupied by Eastern Europeans8 and Nepalese9.
The engagement of people that seem to have little stake in the conflict in Iraq
still serves to amaze. Conventionally one would not expect to find Ugandans
on a military base in Baghdad. This probably derives from a deep rooted belief
in national armies and the “heroic” country men fighting in battles for their
“fatherland”. These normative ideas about the “good soldier” and “bad mer-
cenary” developed alongside the nation state and its standing armies (Kaldor,
2007) as well as notions about a possibility of a “just war” (Evans, 2005). The
influence of these and other debates framing the phenomenon at hand will be
laid out in the next section.
1.2 overview of scholarly literature and debates
Many scholarly publications have examined the privatisation of security, es-
pecially in late international relations (IR) and political science research. The
body of literature can be – simplified – divided into two strands: The one
focuses tentatively on civil security provision, referring mostly to Private Se-
curity Companies (PSCs). The other highlights military security provision of
Private Military Companies (PMCs). In the civil realm private security has
been extensively studied in urban areas, like Johannesburg and Cape Town
(Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008), but also in Canadian cities (Lippert, 2012). Con-
texts of limited public security delivery capabilities, like large cities in Latin
America and Africa or resource extraction sites, have particularly been places
of extensive private securitisation (Abrahamsen, 2011). A central point of de-
bate is the constitution of security as a private or public good and the respec-
tive social consequences. In the area of military private security – which is
more relevant to the case at hand – the “market for force” coined by Deborah
Avant is a central concept. Governmental, non-governmental, profit and non-
profit actors buy the security needed for their respective endeavours in con-
flict zones from PMCs (Avant, 2005). This has been accompanied by a practice
of massive outsourcing among national armies. While the term ’outsourcing’
comes from the private sector, where businesses delegate tasks to subcontrac-
tors for reasons of cost effectiveness (Appelbaum, 2014), whole militaries have
been restructured under the same neoliberal concept (Ettinger, 2011). Where
Ettinger points to a somewhat shrinking state, Mark Neocleous (2007) rather
emphasises the commodification of security taking a marxist political econ-
omy perspective. Authors like Saskia Stachowitsch (2013) have pointed to a
remasculinisation of military contingents due to privatisation. These consider-
ations are often accompanied by a discourse of newness, that either perceives
8 Eastern Europeans would at times work in highly payed positions of the so called ’expats’, while
in other instances just like other TCNs and therefore presents an interesting group between the
above described binary of ’expats’ and TCNs.
9 This chronology of recruitment is based on the assessments of an industry insider.
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PMCs as an entirely recent phenomenon or as a current manifestation of ear-
lier forms of mercenarism (Chesterman and Lehnardt, 2007). In this respect the
discussion about a changed nature of war along the lines of “old” vs “new”
(Kaldor, 2007) or symmetric and asymmetric (Münkler, 2006) has been influ-
ential for private military research. The current privatisation of warfare seems
to be a return from the national exceptionalism that saw a prevalence of citi-
zen armies over mercenary activity (Avant, 2000). A large part of the literature
focuses on the possibilities and imperatives of national and international legal
control of PMCs (Sheehy et al., 2009; Tonkin, 2011). Elke Krahmann (2012) has
observed a change in international legal discourses where private actors have
managed to frame themselves as strongly distinct from mercenaries as accept-
able legitimate providers of armed force. One other widely discussed issue is
the relationship between the employment of PMCs and the state monopoly
of violence10, particularly for the situation of the US (Krahmann, 2013). It has
been argued that today the US would not be able to wage war without private
military and security providers (Deitelhoff, 2008).
’Armed TCNs’11 have become an important group of actors over the course
of the Iraq war, yet their emergence has been largely neglected in mainstream
IR and PMC literature, apart from references to their existence (Isenberg, 2006;
Kinsey, 2009). At the intersection to other fields of study their presence has
been discussed. Paul Higate (2012b) examined the intricate interplay of race
and gender on the perception and recruitment of Latin Americans and Fijians.
A similar perspective on the gendered and racialised Fijian militarism was
taken by Teresia Teaiwa (2008). She traced the culture of military labour ex-
ternalisation in various aspects of Fijian society. Nic Maclellan (2006a; 2006b)
focused more on labour mobility when depicting the various pathways Fijians
pursued to work in foreign military contingents. Focusing on Honduras, Adri-
enne Pine (2010) analysed the public health implications of war looking also at
Honduran contractors in Iraq and their poor working conditions. While focus-
ing on the trajectories of the most prominent PMC company in Iraq, Blackwa-
ter, Jeremy Scahill (2011) also illuminates how Chileans emerged as a favoured
group of TCNs employed by this company. Katherine McCoy gave a general
overview in 2009 on US recruitment of TCNs and interrogated in 2010 the
implications of a private multinational workforce for the possibility of public
control over the military. Maya Eichler (2014) explored the consequences for
the individual TCN, when only hired as a contractor, not being able to enjoy
the benefits of acquiring US or UK citizenship. This acquisition would be pos-
sible, if these people were absorbed as foreign nationals into the regular army
like military migrants (Ware, 2012). Maya Mynster Christensen (2013) depicted
in her dissertation on shadow soldiering in Sierra Leone the conditions under
10 As part of this debate authors often work with the idealistic assumption of a clear distinction
between private and public realm. However, observations of the private militarised security
sector show, that individuals easily comute between both areas. The co-founder of Blackwater
Erik Prince was a former Navy SEAL, in Uganda the owner of an influencial recruitment com-
pany had close ties to the government and a report by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics
in Washington, found that 70% of three and four star generals retiring between 2009 and 2011
have found payed positions in the defense industry (CREW, 2014).
11 I will summarise the academic debate on this group in the following section. The group of TCNs
that worked in the domestic service industry – though not addressed here – has also received
some attention, especially with an emphasis on human rights violations (Brown, 2008).
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which private security recruitment to Iraq has been used as a strategy to alle-
viate potential tensions arising from youth unemployment.
1.3 thesis design
The thesis will focus on ’armed TCNs’ in Iraq and the national distribution
across this heterogeneous group. The goal is to provide a social scientific expla-
nation for the national composition of TCNs12. The emergence of this group of
actors is considerably recent and has thus far not received adequate attention
in scholarly literature. The recruitment of TCNs on this scale is currently a new
phenomenon13. Their recruitment presents the manifestation of a rigorously ex-
ecuted profit maximising business rational: If PMSCs work like other private
corporations under laws of cost effectiveness, then employing the cheapest
workforce possible is the obvious next step - in which national boundaries be-
come insignificant. Studying this group is imperative for a thorough apprecia-
tion of the worldwide reach of major PMSCs. An examination of this group’s
internal national distribution and how it evolved is a humble endeavour, but
has potentially far-reaching implications for the meticulous condition of the
nation state; ranging from persistent influence to inconspicuous irrelevance.
The private security sector in Iraq has been chosen for examination, because
even though in their military engagement in Afghanistan the US also relied
heavily on private contractors, the number of TCNs there was much lower,
with Local Nationals (LNs) filling most of their positions (Schwartz, 2009). The
years 2003 to 2011 provide a timely frame for the analysis that corresponds to
the US occupation and military presence in Iraq. Within this period large scale
TCN recruitment emerged. The US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 is a suitable
demarcation into the present, since thereafter a stronger Iraqi engagement and
diffusion of the sector impede a coherent analysis. In 2013, for example, the
Iraqi government took a strong turn towards more LN employment in the se-
curity sector. During the time in question US PMSCs dominated the private
security sector14. Their recruitment scheme was shaped by US legislation and
most prominently by the legal framework of the countries they recruited from.
However, these legal conditions will be only referred to broadly based on the
UN Working Group on Mercenaries reports and the media coverage. These
sources provide a sufficient assessment of the legal situation, making an in-
quiry into the concrete wording of law unnecessary for the examination at
hand. Due to the focus of this thesis and the impact of the US in the given time
frame, potential influences from Iraqi actors will be omitted in the analysis.
The national composition of ’armed TCNs’ is puzzling, particularly the per-
vasiveness of people from countries that appear to have little stake in the con-
flict in Iraq. Thus, the question arises: How can the national distribution among
12 Of course this does in no way imply invoking – natural science like – causal mechanisms. This
would mean finding relations of cause and effect that are necessary and universal. A social
scientific explanation, by contrast, will show human practices and trace plausible reasons for it.
13 I refer here to the contemporary provision of private militarised security that has reemerged
after a period of national exceptionalism within warfare. Taking a historical perspective, of
course, this recruitment has antecedents in the employment of colonial soldiers in World War
One and Two.
14 British and Australian companies were also active, but to a lesser extend.Their engagement was
relevant in the Fijian case that will be discussed in chapter 4.
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’armed TCNs’ in the US-led private security sector in Iraq be explained? This
main research question is central to this thesis. It operates on two levels, the
one tentatively more descriptive bound to the question of how, the other some-
what more analytical demanding explanatory insights of the why. Accordingly
sub-questions are: How did a particular group of nationals gain access to the
employment opportunities in Iraq? Why was this group recruited? Why were
these people willing to work in Iraq?
The possible reactions to these inquiries are condensed to four hypotheses
that each emphasise influential aspects focusing on: a) economic considera-
tions, b) political conditions, c) the historical-structural setting, and d) military
reputation and qualifications. I developed this array of hypotheses from the
various implicit and explicit explanatory attempts I found in reports, journalis-
tic and academic accounts. Economic considerations (a) led to the hypotheses
that TCNs were recruited from low income countries that struggle with un-
employment. This would create a demand for work abroad with comparably
higher wages, while serving the recruiters need for low payed labour. When
giving special importance to the political environment (b), it could be argued
that successful recruitment occurs if the political actors are supportive of it
and potentially the war in Iraq, as well. With a focus on historical-structural
preconditions (c), an explanation would be that people were either recruited
from countries with long-established ties to the US or respectively from for-
mer British colonies. A hypotheses assuming military reputation and qualifica-
tions (d) to be decisive postulates that TCNs were sought out where recruiters
found an actual or assumed pool of people with adequate military and linguis-
tic qualifications. I argue that these hypotheses are neither mutually exclusive
nor require simultaneity. They simply present four possible influential aspects
with differing degrees of validity, depending on the respective national case.
Their theoretical background and implications will be spelled out in detail in
chapter 2.
The thesis’s focus is empirical. Therefore not a coherent theory, but rather
a prudent examination of possible explanations will be sought. Thus, the four
hypotheses will be tested to their explanatory value through a comparative
examination of three national groups: Chileans, Fijians and Ugandans15. The
development and potential reasons for recruitment in each of these groups
will be examined in a case study. The three different cases highlight different
aspects and angles of the recruitment that are in some instances particular
to the national group and in others also representative of general recurring
themes and dynamics. The limited but insightful academic literature about
TCNs will serve to further the (theoretical) understanding of the empirical
material that will be largely provided by news items, reports and additional
expert interviews. Of particular relevance were the reports of the “United Na-
tions Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human
rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination”
(hereafter referred to as the UN Working Group on Mercenaries). These re-
ports have been very insightful for the cases of Chile and Fiji. These sources
will make available information and data, yet will also be critically assessed,
especially in regard to terminology and certain discoursive practices. While the
15 The justification of their selection will be discussed in the following chapter on page 9.
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cases of Chile and Fiji have also received scholarly attention, the Ugandan case
has not been adequately examined. Due to my own prior interest in this case
I had conducted an interview with an Ugandan contractor that had returned
from Iraq16. In the scope of my Bachelor thesis I have – among others – used
the media service AllAfrica.com to further familiarise myself with the topic17.
For the current research inquiry I have conducted an interview with Brig. Fred
Tolit the Ugandan defense attaché to the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia in January 2014. A further interview was conducted via email with
a US industry insider of the private security sector in and the recruitment for
Iraq, in April 201418.
The terminology of this thesis corresponds mostly to the language used by
the private security industry itself. Since these are the actors under scrutiny
here, it seems reasonable to adapt their language19. However, that does not
mean that their entire frame of reasoning is endorsed, but stems rather from
a respect towards the actors involved in shaping the research object. Accord-
ingly the term “mercenary” is omitted completely. It is often used in public,
policy and academic debates to identify those operating illegally under ques-
tionable motivation from those whose actions are accepted and within the law.
For the examination at hand the term holds no analytical value. Companies
providing security related and military related services will be referred to as
Private Militarised Security Companies (PMSCs) to indicate the wide range of
their activities and possible militarised habitus. The wider industry and sec-
tor will mostly be referred to as providing private security. This open phrase
should capture all security related tasks, from secure convoy and logistics, to
personnel and infrastructure details20. This sector remains tentatively distinct
from the narrower understanding of military activity, which may be provided
by some of these companies as well, but was rather carried out by the expats
and did not involve the employment of TCNs. The people employed by the
private security industry are mostly individual contractors without the legal
status of an employee and will thus be referred to as contractors. Yet, in a wider
sense they were ’employed’ by the respective companies. As noted above TCNs
are contractors from a country that is neither part of the coalition forces nor
the host nation. As the UN Working Group on Mercenaries explained, their
16 The interview was conducted in November 2010 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The young Ugan-
dan, then in the twenties, had worked two years in Iraq for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Tech-
nology (EODT). For reasons of confidentiality further personal details will not be specified.
17 The Bachelor thesis research question inquired about the interests different Ugandan groups
of actors had in the recruitment of security contractors for Iraq. The political elite, recruiting
companies and individual contractors were examined on the basis of an extensive media review
of the country’s two leading English newspapers The New Vision and The Monitor. The thesis
was submitted in July 2012 at the Institute of African Studies at the University of Leipzig in
Germany.
18 This source requested to remain anonymous and will be simply referred to as an ’industry
insider’.
19 Similarly, an inherent methodological nationalism will be accepted. This does not correspond to
an unquestioned acceptance of the imagined unity between society and nation-state (Chernilo,
2006), but is somewhat a consequence of the conceptual framing of Third Country Nationals in
(private) military parlance.
20 There are attempts of categorising the private security sector, like the “Tip of the Spear Typol-
ogy” that groups companies according to the services they provide and their proximity to the
“front line” (Singer, 2011, 91). But these attempts are often static and narrow and are therefore
not employed here.
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recruitment “[...] is often associated with the establishment by transnational
companies of satellite subsidiaries that have legal status in one country, pro-
vide services in another and hire personnel in a third country.” (del Prado,
2008a, para. 6).
Following this introduction, chapter 2 will outline the approach of the thesis
and theoretical debates relevant to the subject. Since the scope of the thesis
is empirical the topic will be located in the broader theoretical environment
only cursory, focusing on the two most important aspects: the commodifica-
tion of security and the spacial dimension of the war in Iraq. This chapter’s
main objective is to formulate the various explanatory perspectives and hy-
potheses. This will be followed by the more empirical part of the thesis, com-
prising of three chapters each dealing with one of the case studies: Chile, Fiji
and Uganda. These chapters are two-part, with the first depicting how a group
was recruited to Iraq and the second interrogating the why; by examining the
possible reasoning behind it. In chapter 3 on Chile the legal difficulties of the
recruitment company will be depicted and its consequent regional entangle-
ments, while in the second part the military reputation of the Chileans and
their long-established ties to the US will be put in relation to the security work
in Iraq. In the first part of the following chapter 4 on Fiji their recruitment
for anglophone militaries and peacekeeping will be juxtaposed with that for
Iraq and thereafter the small island’s history as a troop supplier is examined.
Chapter 5 on Uganda will first depict how the country emerged within a short
period of time as the major provider of TCNs in Iraq, and second attribute this
rapid development to the economical and politically conducive environment.
A conclusion will summarise the findings of the thesis and allude to prospects
of further research.
2
CONCEPTUAL ARRANGEMENT
Rather than strictly focusing on a blueprint-type discussion of theories and
methods to frame a detached empirical analysis, this chapter has the purpose
of preparing the intellectual environment in which the later observations will
be embedded. While the title “conceptual arrangement” implies a less ortho-
dox modus operandi, the chapter nevertheless outlines how the analysis is
carried out and provides the theoretical base for understanding the national
composition of TCNs in the private security sector in Iraq.
The particular research approach and theory furnish the framework for gen-
erating and testing hypotheses. The evaluation of hypotheses has an experi-
mental element to it, weighing different aspects against each other, while try-
ing to find the one with the highest explanatory value. In the natural sciences
this process is conducted in the laboratory through experiments, whereas in
the social sciences the laboratory can be equated to the written word and the
text it produces (Latour, 2007, 149). Where microscopes and chemical reagents
are used by the one, the other depends on the “force of abstraction” to achieve
a clear view of the research object (Marx, 1992, 27). The way in which abstrac-
tions are framed depends on the choice of a particular academic school. In this
fashion the thesis is understood as a “laboratory” - a written space to try out
and find an explanation to empirical observations.
At the beginning of this chapter the research design of the thesis is laid
out. Afterwards two decisive parameters of the phenomenon under scrutiny
are theorised: the commodification of security and the spacial dimension of
the Iraq War. Eventually the hypotheses relevant to the cases of the thesis are
discussed within the realm of their theory informed assumptions.
2.1 the ’laboratory’ and its equipment
The positionality of a scholar within the disciplinary landscape conditions how
a research problem is framed and approached. Once one chooses to centre
inquiries around problems instead of methods, a traditional disciplinary be-
haviour is left behind. Theo van Leeuwen distinguishes between “three models
of interdisciplinarity”: The “centralist model” departs from a focus on partic-
ular methods inherent to the respective disciplines, which are perceived as
independent from one another. The “pluralist model” deviates from this con-
ventional understanding of disciplines by seeing them as equally valid, yet
autonomous, approaches to a problem. The “integrationist” model takes this
a step further by assuming an interdependence of the disciplines, with all of
them equally important to understanding a particular problem (van Leeuwen,
2005, 10). Drawing on Leeuwen, this means for this thesis that methodologi-
cal considerations are secondary to the focus on a particular problem - here
the national composition of TCNs. The aim is rather to make the process of
reasoning transparent and traceable.
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The research question has been formulated independently of any particu-
lar disciplinary affiliation. The various disciplinary approaches are seen as
mutually dependent for approaching the research problem and are hence re-
duced to providers of a particular form of thinking within the examination.
Accordingly, I will draw on theoretical implications of a disciplinary nature
merely as different levels of analysis in order to contextualise and organise
the different hypotheses relevant to my research question. These hypotheses
will be scrutinised in the detailed examination of three cases: Chile, Fiji and
Uganda. In each case a different composition of hypotheses will be more or
less valid, taking simultaneously an inherently comparative perspective. The
case study approach1 is particularly useful for two reasons. On the one hand
the research question of this thesis is enquiring the how and why of TCN recruit-
ment, and thereby employs questions that typically suggest a case study ap-
proach (Kohlbacher, 2006). On the other hand the phenomenon that is being re-
searched can not be separated from its context, which also makes this approach
feasible. In addition the particular context of private security provision in Iraq
limits the possibilities for comprehensive data gathering. Therefore a flexible
framework is needed to incorporate multiple forms of empirical sources. Ap-
proaching the research subject through case studies allows for these various
sources of information and a somewhat eclectic use of them. Drawing largely
on Robert Yin’s (1993) suggestions for the conduct of case study research, here
the research design is modelled tentatively after his idea of an ’explanatory
multi-case study’2 (Yin, 1993, 5). Eventually the aim of the analysis is to ar-
rive at an analytical abstraction that is relevant to the understanding of the
phenomenon at hand.
The three cases were selected with the intention to show the variety of rea-
sons and ways in which a national group got engaged with security work in
Iraq. This intention could tentatively be realised with favouring a most differ-
ent comparative research design, following an intensive strategy where few
cases with many variables are examined (Keman, 2008, 69). In order to display
the development of the recruitment in Iraq over time the cases were chosen and
are depicted in the analysis according to the time when recruitment in these
countries started. Simultaneously, the selection was influenced by an aim to
show the differences and similarities of recruitment across regions. The latest
scholarly expression of this approach is manifested in the current popularity
of comparative area studies (Oettler, 2014). In the following the “areas”3 Latin
America, Asia/Pacific and Africa will be of relevance to the nations under
scrutiny. The empirical and theoretical ease with which disciplinary and re-
gional boundaries are denied their dividing power, is rooted in the belief that
1 I will refer to the case study as a way to approach a research problem, taking into account that
case studies have been argued to be a type of research design rather than a method (Kohlbacher,
2006).
2 Yin defines “Six different types of case studies”, being either a single or a multiple case-study
and respectively either exploratory, descriptive or explanatory (Yin, 1993, 5).
3 The term “area” remains contested and is used here for lack of a better alternative, but with
the awareness “that histories produce geographies and not vice versa” (Appadurai, 2010). The
division of these areas is rooted in European colonial and US Cold War knowledge production
to research the respective Other as Immanuel Wallerstein (1988) and David Szanton (2004) have
spelled out in detail.
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the field of Global Studies has the potential to transcend the former schism
between area studies and disciplines (Döring, 2013).
In light of these considerations recruitment in Chile, Fiji and Uganda was
chosen for the case studies. Even though among Latin Americans only Peru-
vians worked in significant numbers as TCNs, the Chilean engagement presents
a particular turning point in the recruitment of private contractors. They were
part of the first group of TCNs recruited after the typical expats and sort of
’opened up the market’ for Latin American contractors. Fijians on the other
hand were indeed the predominant TCNs from the Asia Pacific that fit the cat-
egory under scrutiny in this thesis. Other countries exporting large numbers
of labour to Iraq like the Philippines, Pakistan and Sri Lanka supplied blue
collar workers or what I call ’unarmed’ non-combat workers. However, there
were also Nepalese and Indian private security contractors, though the later na-
tional group was rather associated with domestic unarmed non-combat work4.
The case of Uganda is maybe the most obvious to include, since these TCNs
seem to have made up the largest national group, with over 10.000 individuals
having worked in Iraq (Ahimbisibwe, 2008). While this recruitment received
considerable national and international media attention (Ahimbisibwe, 2006;
Mmali, 2009; Gehlen, 2010; Vicky, 2012), it has not been addressed in academic
publications nor investigated by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries5.
The empirical material on which the case studies are built has been exam-
ined qualitatively, mostly drawing on material information, but also has been
critically evaluated when necessary. Particularly relevant to the research were
a number of respective local and international print media as well as reports
by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries and the Congressional Research
Service. In addition, three expert interviews have been conducted which com-
pensate the lack of official reports on the Ugandan case. The interviewees are
treated as informants giving valuable insight and a qualified evaluation with
their interview’s content being used cautiously dosed (Littig, 2008).
2.2 setting the stage : commodification of security and spacial-
ity of warfare
At the heart of the phenomenon under scrutiny lies the concern with security.
Security has developed from being an inherently public good to (also) being a
commodity, a product that can be consumed and is provided by private entities.
In addition to citizens and businesses also the state, the former sole provider
of security is purchasing security services (Krahmann, 2008; Avant, 2005). The
standing or citizen national army seems to have been an exception in time and
space that emerged in France, Prussia and Britain during the 19th century, su-
perseding the use of mercenaries (Avant, 2000). The re-emergence of private
security provision in the civil and military realm has attracted attention and
anxiety. Yet, in particular for the US, contracting out services in military en-
gagement goes back as far as the Revolutionary or Civil Wars. In the Second
World War technicians from manufacturing companies were working near the
4 In the interview with the Ugandan security contractor he notes that Indians took care of general
cleaning activities, while Sarah Stillmen reports that Indians worked alongside Bangladeshis in
catering (Stillman, 2011).
5 At least according to the authors knowledge upon writing.
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front line to maintain their employer’s equipment (Cotton et al., 2010, 9). In
the 1990s the Department of Defense (DoD) started actively “integrating con-
tractors into the force structure” to ensure cost efficiency (Cotton et al., 2010,
10). Contracting out military tasks is not only motivated by reducing public
spending, but has also the positive effect of reducing US military casualties.
The reasons for “Western” democracies’ apprehension towards their citizens
being killed or injured in war have long since been discussed, whether it be
historical experiences of war, an inherent feature of democratic rule where ca-
sualties may compromise public opinion, or caused by low fertility rates and
a consequent cultural importance on each young person’s survival (Schörnig
and Lembcke, 2006, 207).
The companies tasked with the provision of security in post-war Iraq func-
tion according to rules of cost effectiveness and are in competition with each
other over contracts provided by the main employers, the US Department of
State (DoS), Department of Defence (DoD) and US Agency for International
Development (USAID)6. One way of decreasing costs for a corporation is by re-
ducing labour costs. With an improving security situation in Iraq, PMSCs went
from hiring highly trained personnel with special operations backgrounds to
employing less skilled people for lower wages. The provision of security in
and around military bases, the duty at check points or logistic security did
not require specialised military training and could therefore be carried out
by personnel with only limited military training. Instead of employing highly
skilled contractors with special forces experience from the US, Australia or
South Africa for high daily wages, so called TCNs were hired that could do
the same job for a smaller salary.
The contractors of the security sector made up the largest contingent in the
“Coalition of the Willing” (Neocleous, 2007, 344). Ken Silverstein argues that
“mercenaries are the foot-soldiers of privatization” (in Neocleous, 2007, 346).
Taking the socio-economic condition of TCNs into account, this would apply
even more to them. In 1990 Sassen discussed the relation between the interna-
tionalisation of production and migration, lamenting that these two phenom-
ena had been previously analysed separately. She noted a “massive shift of
jobs to Third World countries through direct foreign investment, resulting in
the development of an off-shore manufacturing sector” (Sassen, 1990, 12). In
light of the discursive framing of the 2003 Iraq war as part of the “Global War
on Terror”, it can be assumed that US security is seen to be ’manufactured’ not
within, but outside its national boundaries (Aas, 2012). Interpreted according
to such logic, US capital is used in “off-shore” locations like Iraq to produce
’security’ for the US with cheap labour from the “Global South”.
The point of departure for this thesis is the widespread transnational recruit-
ment that occurred in Iraq. The sheer distance and diversity of places where
TCNs came from to work in the private security sector is impressive. The spa-
cial significance of the global reach of this war will be briefly alluded to here.
The importance of space becomes evident when interrogating the puzzle-
ment that is often the immediate reaction to the TCNs involvement in Iraq.
Why is it surprising to find this diverse array of nationalities there? Appar-
ently, there are prevailing assumptions of how space and people are ordered.
6 Here it is assumed that contracts are signed with the lowest bidder, not considering personal
networks or possible corruption.
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Space is imagined as predefined, already having been organised into different
places all bound and separated (Massey, 1999, 11). Similarly, people are per-
ceived as bounded, especially by their nationality. Who is perceived to have or
not have a stake in a war is reasoned accordingly. When empirical phenomena
cut through such reasoning of spacial reality, it is often explained with “glob-
alisation”. This process is thought to be defined by “unfettered movement”;
globalisation imagined “in terms of unbounded free space”, resembling the
“powerful rhetoric of neoliberalism around ’free trade’” (Massey, 1999, 16).
However, a closer look exposes such superficial conclusions, revealing that
places are still very much bound and people restricted by them.
The US led Iraq War has a particular spacial dimension, especially due to
its embeddedness in the US “War on Terror” at times even called the “Global
War on Terror”7. This rhetoric is informed by the belief that the categories of
proximity and distance are blurring due to increased mobility and connectivity.
Now, so it is thought, “(l)ocal harms and security issues are a product of a long
chain of geographically often dispersed and un-bounded events and actions.”
(Aas, 2012, 235). In such a situation, national security will depend more and
more on international security (ibid.). Holmqvist links such assumptions back
to Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Bauman, observing: “Thus the claim is made
that war, peace and security are ’essentially, extraterritorial issues that evade
territorial solutions’.” (Holmqvist, 2012, 227). The US, in the Iraq War, could be
seen as doing essentially that, pursuing national security concerns outside its
territory, while involving people from beyond its territory in the place of war
– Iraq – to implement its interests8.
When examining the spacial aspect of the situation of TCNs in Iraq, it is
noteworthy that they are far removed from their “host country”. They are
employed by US companies, while never touching US ground and work in a
third country – Iraq, where they also remain largely detached from the local
population due to the nature of their work. This recruitment further shows
that the US influence reaches far beyond its territory. Similar observations have
been made by different scholars and captured in terms of “imperial globality”
(Escobar, 2004) or by invoking notions of “empire” (Hardt and Negri, 2000).
Zillah Eisenstein (Eisenstein, 2007) examined in a feminist account of the US
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the “imperial democracy” with its gendered and
racialised appropriation of women’s rights discourses to further a militarist
and masculinist pursuit of international dominance.
2.3 four perspectives
There are a number of possible explanations for the national composition of
TCN working in Iraq. In the following, four hypotheses will be discussed in
7 The phrase “Global War on Terror” is most prominently used in relation to the decoration with
the “Global War on Terrorism Service Medal”. A form of distinction that was conceived by
President George W. Bush in 2003.
8 Taking a more liberal point of view, one could argue that the US government or DoD are not
responsible for this transnational reach since the recruiting and employing entities are private
companies; yet, this would only be a valid objection, if one assumed a complete and clean
separation between the public and private military sectors. Neocleous has argued for a Marxist
reading of this situation assuming rather a “unity [sic] of state and capital” (Neocleous, 2007,
349).
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light of the theoretical background their respective assumptions derive from.
Some of them derive from explanations the involved actors themselves or jour-
nalists gave.
Economic considerations
In the public debate in the sending countries on the recruitment of their people
as TCN to Iraq, politicians pointed out that going for security work in Iraq
was an individual decision. Labour, Gender and Social Development Minister
Zoe Bakoko Bakoru from Uganda said in 2006: “The people who are recruited
to work in Iraq or elsewhere in the world make those choices themselves.”
(Nyanzi, 2006). Similar words came from the Prime Minister’s Office in Fiji:
“We all know about the war in Iraq and [the] risks associated with the job,
so it’s an individual’s choice. The government cannot stop anyone because
they are exercising their constitutional right and freedom to travel and work
anywhere.” (in Maclellan, 2006a, 51).
These actors implicitly framed the TCN employment as labour migration.
Their statements resonate a “neo-classical economic perspective” that centres
around push and pull factors to explain an “individual[’s] decision to migrate,
based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining in
the area of origin or moving to various alternative destinations.” (Casteles and
Miller, 2003, 22). The push factors are the sum of reasons for people to consider
leaving their country, while the pull factors attract migration towards a certain
destination where opportunities are believed to be better. Invoking a similar ra-
tional choice logic, the companies can be seen to work profit maximising. This
holds true for the influential, mostly US and UK corporations that are directly
contracted by the US government, as well as for the local recruitment compa-
nies. The first group seeks cheap labour, while the second seeks to mediate
many contracts in order to deduct their fees.
If security is the commodity and it depends highly on human labour for
its production, then in order to cut down production costs lower wages are
desirable for a company. Companies have been observed to turn increasingly
to a vast pool of cheap labour from the “Global South” in industries that largely
depend on human interaction 9. The spacial and subsequently national reach
of this labour recruitment has been facilitated by a decrease in transportation
and communication costs. TCNs worked in Iraq in a US induced “higher-wage
economy” (Casteles and Miller, 2003) and use their money for, what I call, ’life-
investment’ at home: financing education, marriage or starting a family, and
investing in housing or business developments.
Against this intellectual backdrop a hypothesis is rooted in an economic
understanding and claims that TCN were recruited from countries with a low
income level (also in their national military) and high unemployment. This
would create a demand for these sort of jobs as well serving the demand of
companies for low cost labour.
9 This has been described for the care-giving sector by Ehrenreich & Hochschild (2014).
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Political conditions
Individual politicians in favour or against recruitment activities in their coun-
try have had a large impact on the scale of recruitment. In Sierra Leone for
example the Ministry of Labour and Social Security actively promoted the
recruitment of security guards for Iraq in the context of “Overseas Youth Em-
ployment”, while in Liberia President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf viewed it very crit-
ically and prevented larger recruitment (Christensen, 2013, 163; 166). Apart
from the domestic influence of a particular government, its foreign politics can
affect recruitment. It could be argued that companies would initially attempt
recruitment in countries with good relationships to the US. More precisely, a
supportive attitude towards the war in Iraq could be relevant as well as a coun-
try’s willingness to partake in the “War on Terror” or even the “Coalition of
the Willing”.
The legal realities of a country are shaped by political actors. The recruit-
ment processes were embedded in the legal context of the involved national-
ities that shaped the flow of people abroad. The legislation could have had
either a disruptive or a conducive impact10. In case of disruption, companies
might find a country suitable for labour recruitment, but its legislation would
not allow this sort of labour externalisation. From these countries only some
people made it to Iraq for work, but mostly individually being recruited via
a company in a neighbouring country. This disruptive effect of a country’s le-
gal framework will be depicted in the case study on Chilean recruitment. An
alternative scenario occurred when governments that had allowed their citi-
zens to go for private security work in Iraq later banned their people from
working there, resulting in an abrupt end to the presence of these nationals
in Iraq (obviously there are a few individual exceptions that still manage to
work abroad). In this manner, the Philippines and Nepal banned their citizens
from working in Iraq11. In 2004 after a Filipino man had been kidnapped12
and 12 Nepalese workers had been killed, the working environment in Iraq
was deemed to insecure (BBC, 2010; The National, 2013)13. If the legislation
was conducive to the security labour export it could – potentially – regulate
the recruitment process and working conditions of the contractors, a situation
that will be demonstrated by the Ugandan recruitment.
A country’s government could sanction the recruitment and shape respec-
tive legislation. An explanation for a national groups’ presence in Iraq would
be that if successful recruitment to Iraq would occur, the political actors were
supportive of it and maybe even the war itself, shaping the national legal frame-
work accordingly.
10 Though one could assume a clandestine or simply illegal recruitment that would circumvent
legislation and would - as a third form of impact - not be affected by it at all.
11 Even though these were workers mostly from construction sites and not armed TCNs.
12 The man was released later, after the President of the Philippines withdrew his troops from the
coalition forces.
13 Both countries have resumed labour relations with Iraq; Nepal lifted the ban in 2010 and the
Philippines in 2013.
2.3 four perspectives 16
Historical-structural setting
Whereas the two explanations laid out so far tentatively emphasise agency,
a more historically rooted approach would invoke structuralist assumptions.
While this is a rather simplistic distinction, it nevertheless is interesting to trace
notions of structuralist assumptions in the evaluation of the transnational secu-
rity labour recruitment of TCNs. Some of the journalistic accounts have even
drawn a parallel to slave trade. Mugerwa and Amoru (2008) titled their news
article on Ugandans working in Iraq “’Sold like slaves’ to private guard com-
panies in Iraq”14. Another journalist, Raz Guy (2007) suggested to label Third
Country Nationals (TCN) “third-world nationals” since most of them came
from countries commonly referred to as the “third world”. Paul Higate’s ar-
ticle on Latin American and Fijian TCN in Iraq was (re-)published in the an-
thology “Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers
and Globalizing Rescue Industries” that also presumes a global structure of in-
equality (Amar, 2014). The observation by Thierry Tardy (2013), though from
the context of peacekeeping operations summarises this reasoning nicely:
Some point to a new form of Northern domination of the Global
South through the so-called ’great outsourcing experience’: the North
pays in dollars and the South in blood. (Tardy, 2013, 3).
Such a North-South binary was also invoked by Andre Gunder Frank (1992)
when he evaluated the Gulf War. He argued that the war could be read as a
“Third World [sic] War by the North against the South”, putting the later “in
its place in the new world order” (Frank, 1992, 267; 280). Taking up Raz Guy’s
comment on TCN as “third-world nationals” and considering their practical
importance for the Iraq War in the early 2000s, Frank’s term, “Third World
War”, could acquire a new meaning. By contrast, Immanuel Wallersein was
exploring the concept of one world defined by a “world system” that included
countries in differing ways, putting them in different positions in relation to
each other either in the “core” or the ”periphery” (Wallerstein, 1993). Taking
such a world-systems approach, TCNs would come from the countries at the
“periphery” and work, if not in, but for the “core” nations. Colonialism and
imperialism framed the relations between these countries and the US and UK,
which are home to the leading PMSCs that provided security in Iraq. Asym-
metric relationships that were formed along a power imbalance still continue
to shape today’s political economy. Eventually, it could be reckoned that there
have been some sort of channels of military recruitment prior to the – priva-
tised – Iraq engagement. This could be either in the frame of colonial soldiers
(Killingray, 1989), military migration (Ware, 2012) or any other asymmetric
military relationship to a “core” power.
The hypothesis drawn from this body of reasoning is that TCN were re-
cruited from countries that are traditional military labour exporters due to
their colonial history or an analogous relationship with the US.
14 However, the work of armed TCN can generally not be regarded as part of a ’new slavery’. The
journalist points to very low wages and harsh working conditions, which are grim, but the case
of TCN does not per se include economic exploitation through “the total control of one person
by another” (Bales, 2014, 329).
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Military reputation and qualification
When trying to make sense of the recruitment of seemingly uninvolved people
to Iraq, it was reasoned that certain nationals would have particular military
qualities. This was then attributed to a country’s war experiences. In the case
of Peruvian TCNs their history of fighting against Sendero Luminoso (Shining
Path) was mentioned and in the case of Uganda, their campaign against the
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) or the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (Páez,
2005; Herbert, 2007). In an news article on Serbians working in the security
sector in Iraq the author invoked similar reasoning and opened the article
with this line: “Fighting gets into your veins, said men who fought in former
Yugoslavia. And so now that peace has come to their homeland, many have
moved to Iraq.” (Zimonjic, 2004). Such essentialist heuristics with regard to
potentially skilled personnel could be seen to have influenced recruiters as
well.
To attract the attention of PMSC recruiters, it would be argued that a group
of people had to have some sort of martial or military reputation from which
people would assume that members of this (national) group would be partic-
ularly fit for military work. Higate (2012b) described how TCNs would appro-
priate a particular reputation to secure the lucrative jobs in Iraq. Chileans were
building on a reputation as brutal insurgence and also Fijians would “strike an
ethnic bargain”, monetising on the image of a “warrior culture” (Higate, 2012b,
37; 43). In regard to the colonial legacy and the primordial ethnicised concepts
of the existence of certain “martial races” that were believed to be very suitable
for work, the colonial armies would root these real or assumed qualifications
in historical developments. Identities that were ascribed to groups and appro-
priated by them influenced the development of predispositions that favoured
the formation of military skills and ethos. While this would be induced ex-
ternally, this process could also be produced domestically. A country’s form
of government could emphasise militarisation or a certain historical path may
have led to a large portion of the population being militarily trained.
This explanation takes realist and social constructivist arguments into ac-
count. Recruiters seek personnel with certain qualities and skills. These have
a material element to them: the actual level of training or language skills. Yet,
from this level emerges a discoursive practice over these groups’ qualities cre-
ating an image that may surpass the actual skills. The hypotheses from these
considerations is that TCNs were recruited from countries with a particular
military reputation or where recruiters assumed a pool of militarily skilled
people.
These four possible explanations can be mutually influential, are not exclu-
sive and have different degrees of relevance and validity according to the
respective national cases. They are furthermore interlinked: For example, a
combined economic and political hypotheses can be used if government sup-
port for the Iraq security labour externalisation derives from the revenue the
TCNs earn for their home countries. The political dimension is also linked to
the historical-structural hypothesis since foreign relations usually do have a
temporal component. This history in turn does influence the development of
military qualifications and reputation. At the same time a historical-structural
argument – touching upon Wallerstein – about the integration of a country
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into the “world-system” builds on economic reasoning, just like the individual
level rational of push and pull factors. The following chapters will examine
this empirically.
3
CASE STUDY: CH ILE
Directly after the US led invasion of Iraq, the security situation was seen as very
tense. Private companies tasked with providing security hired highly trained
individuals that had served in high profile military units in the US, UK, West-
ern Europe, Australia, New Zealand or South Africa. These so-called “expats”
often have had a reputation as private contractors, previously seen in the case
of South Africans. Though with time the security situation began to improve.
In this environment most static security positions were associated with lower
risk and did not require highly skilled former military personnel with special
operations background, but could be carried out by people with a good, yet
less specialised military background. This realisation and the inherent pres-
sure of cost effectiveness led the companies to seek other potential employees
who could do the same job for lower wages. In 2004 companies from the UK
began hiring Gurkhas, those from Australia and New Zealand Fijians and US
companies Chileans. This logic was perpetuated as the security situation im-
proved further. Eventually Chilean contractors became too expensive (Scahill,
2011, 198). Throughout 2005 and 2006, instead of Chileans, companies now
recruited Peruvians and Colombians or other Latin Americans that were pre-
pared to work for the falling wages.
3.1 regional recruitment and its legal acrobatics
As the Chileans were among the first “non-expats” to be hired as private
security contractors for work in Iraq, initially their wages were comparably
high. While Ugandans recruited in 2008 would only earn 500 Dollars per
month, Chileans earned between 1.000 Dollar and 4.000 Dollars (Franklin, 2004;
del Prado, 2008a, para. 16)1. While this wage level would not seem lucrative
enough for well employed Chileans, it still tempted some active army service
personnel to request a leave in order to engage in the security work in Iraq. This
also resonates with other cases of TCN or general private security recruitment
(Franklin, 2004). Capable and qualified personnel is being recruited by private
companies, while the education had been payed for by the national army. After
a Chilean had been found to distribute job offers from foreign firms via email
the army started a campaign that warned people about the possible dangers of
going to Iraq along with the often reported contract breaches and labour rights
violations (del Prado, 2008a, para. 23; 24). Former contractors had complained
about the omission of payment, “contractual irregularities, poor working con-
ditions, overcrowding, excessively long working hours, non-payment of wages,
degrading treatment and isolation, and neglect of basic needs, such as health
and hygiene.” (del Prado, 2008a, para. 37). In other coverage Chilean TCNs re-
ferred only to the “very good income” and appeared not to be worried about
1 In the best case, experienced ex-special forces personnel could earn as much as 1.000 Dollar per
day (Franklin, 2004).
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their employment: “In the end, this is an extension of our military career.”
(Franklin, 2004).
The Chilean recruits would work as “independent contractors” (del Prado,
2008a, para. 15). The contracts they signed prior to their employment in Iraq
made it explicit that they would be fully aware of the fact that they would
work in an environment of violent conflict and “freely give their consent and
assume full responsibility for working in such conditions”. Building on this
understanding of their work the recruits had to agree that any company that
they worked for or that was involved in their recruitment would be:
“release[d] [...] from any liability, payment, compensation or assis-
tance in connection with any damage or injury to their personal
safety and/or integrity, which, in the course of performing their du-
ties, may result from any foreseen or unforeseen action on the part
of third parties (beyond what is covered by their life insurance).”
(del Prado, 2008a, para. 18)
This provision of life insurance by the employing companies was required
under US law and the Defense Base Act2. To obtain adequate insurances the
companies first negotiated with a broker who would then deal with different
insurance providers (del Prado, 2008a, para. 19). This process established a
complex network of distributed responsibilities.
A similar diffusion of possible accountability resembles the underlying legal
structure of the contracts. The recruits signed them mostly outside Chile, either
in the US or Jordan, while on their way to Iraq. These documents were then
not even subject to Chilean law, because the recruiting companies were regis-
tered in Uruguay and Panama. This discouraged former employees from ap-
pealing legally against any contract breaches they may have encountered (del
Prado, 2008a, para. 35). This legal situation provided for a highly asymmetri-
cal contractor to company relationship that potentially facilitated exploitative
behaviour from the company’s side.
The central figure in the Chilean recruitment venture was José Miguel Pizarro.
Pizarro was born in California and raised in Santiago, Chile (Falconer and
Schulman, 2008). Being a former Chilean army officer and passionate Pinochet
supporter, he worked as an interpreter for the US military in Latin America
during the 1990s (Scahill, 2011, 190). In 2001 he had set up the company Red
Táctica in the US to arrange contacts between US weapon manufacturers and
Latin American governments (del Prado, 2008a, para. 15). In late 2003 Pizarro
started to recruit “former [...] military and police personnel” from Chile for
Blackwater3 to work in Iraq (ibid.). To facilitate the recruitment and avoid the
ramifications of the Chilean legal system he set up the company Neskowin in
Montevideo, Uruguay. Therefore the contracts signed by the Chilean recruits
as “independent contractors” or “security guards” were liable to the legisla-
tion in Uruguay. As indicated above, this significantly diminished the contrac-
tors ability to insist that their contracts were respected. Even though Pizarro
2 It could not be established, if the insurance would also cover incidences that occurred outside
working hours. Once off duty the contractors would still remain within a volatile and highly
dangerous environment.
3 The company has changed its name in 2009 to Xe Services and then in 2011 to Academi, but
will be referred to in this context under its former name Blackwater.
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worked out of Santiago (Chile) the “former Chilean military and police per-
sonnel” were officially hired in North Carolina (US), where Blackwater had
its headquarters. It was there that an initial 150 Chileans were trained at the
companies own facilities in Moyock, and from there in February 2004 sent to
Diwaniyah, Al-Hillah, Karbala and Basra in Iraq (ibid.).
By the end of 2004 Pizzaro had simultaneously to the relations to Blackwa-
ter also secured business with Triple Canopy. For them he recruited Chileans
through a second company, Global Guards Corporation, also in his name,
but based in Panama. The recruits deployed as security guards to Iraq or
Afghanistan in that time were contracted and trained in Amman4, yet even-
tually worked for different salaries, 3.000 Dollars per month at Blackwater and
1.000 Dollar at Triple Canopy (del Prado, 2008a, para. 16).
Already on the 21st of October 2005 the Military Prosecutor’s Office had
taken legal action against José Miguel Pizarro “on charges of establishing an
armed group and encroaching on the functions of the armed forces and se-
curity forces” (del Prado, 2008a, para. 26). Since the offences committed by
Pizarro were a novelty in this form, the prosecution had to be based on three
different areas: the Weapons Control Act, the Criminal Code and the Decree
Law, which deals with the conduct of private providers of security (del Prado,
2008a, para. 28).
Despite legal action eventually 749 Chileans found their way to work in
Iraq. This number was provided by the criminal investigation police to the
UN Working Group on mercenaries in 20075. According to their report Pizarro
himself had claimed in 2006 - when demand had peaked - that he was able
to dispatch 3.000 Chileans, yet he later said to have sent only 756 (del Prado,
2008a, pa. 20). When considering the accounts of unregistered companies6, it
can be safely assumed that the actual number was higher.
One other documented case of the recruiting of Chileans unfolded through
a Honduran company, which was partly operated by Chileans. Among those
was Oscar Aspe, a longtime acquaintance of Pizarro with whom he had been
to Iraq (del Prado, 2008a, para. 21). The company named Your Solutions Hon-
duras7 had brought 105 Chileans into Honduras; 97 of which were trained
while 8 provided training (de Pérez, 2007b, para. 29). This group entered the
country on tourist visas, while a 50 more Chileans awaited entry to Honduras
via neighbouring El Salvador for the same reasons, but were not allowed to
enter the country (ibid.). The training that was conducted in September 2005
took place without “approval of the national congress” (de Pérez, 2007b, 2)
which caused considerable debate between the legislature and the government
4 Here it is noteworthy that Amman is the capital of Jordan, a country in the region that has
traditionally been close to the UK and US.
5 The UN Working Group on Mercenaries visited Chile in July 2007, Honduras in February 2013,
Ecuador in August 2006 and Peru in January 2007. The respective reports were published mostly
within half a year after the visits.
6 The UN Working Group on Mercenaries named the following companies to be “operating clan-
destinely”: Your Solutions, Loft Security, Land and Fire Integral Services and Britain Security.
The group added that it has been said that among the people involved with operating these
companies were also individuals which used to work with Pizarro. (del Prado, 2008a, pa. 22)
7 The company is a subsidiary of Your Solutions based in Illinois, US who was subcontracted
by Triple Canopy, Washington, US which provided security services directly to the Department
of Defense (de Pérez, 2007b, pa. 18). Your Solutions Honduras was not registered in Honduras
(de Pérez, 2007b, pa. 34).
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(de Pérez, 2007b, para. 1). The UN Working Group on Mercenaries eventually
suggested in their report that the Honduran authorities may consider action
against this recruitment under Article 317 of the Criminal Code “which pun-
ishes ’anyone who recruits troops in Honduras to serve a foreign nation, for
any purpose whatsoever’” (de Pérez, 2007b, para. 63). The training had been
conducted in the district Lepaterique at a former military base that was used
in the 1980s for the training of Nicaraguan Contras as well as the Argentinian
specialist counter-insurgency section from Operatión Condor, the 601st Intel-
ligence Battalion (de Pérez, 2007b, para. 30) and the Honduran death squad
Battalion 316 (Stoner, 2008).
In the second half of 2005 Your Solutions Honduras managed to vet 189
Hondurans to work “as security guards at fixed facilities in Iraq” (de Pérez,
2007b, para. 18). The training of these Hondurans was not only conducted
through local army soldiers, but also by Chileans who frequently used false
names as well as Honduran army soldiers. In the UN Working Group report
the authors point to the inconsistency between the job description and the
subsequent training. Though recruited for security tasks, the actual training
of the Hondurans was “military training and instruction in anti-guerrilla tac-
tics such as possible ambushes and how to avoid them, and deactivation of
explosives and mortars.” (de Pérez, 2007b, para. 20). For the Working Group
to expose this point seems at first sight peculiar, given that Iraq at that time
clearly presented a war zone, where - no matter the job description - security
work would necessarily include some element of combat training. At a closer
look though this mismatch cuts directly to the heart of the problem of security
provision in a combat zone. Simple guarding tasks conventionally form part of
a non-combat or civilian provision of security, but in a violent conflict they are
inevitably confronted with hostilities and become part of a military context.
The regional reach of Chilean recruitment extended beyond Honduras to
Ecuador and Peru. In the former, Chileans, alongside Colombians, were al-
legedly involved in recruiting activities of the local company Epi Security
and Investigations (de Pérez, 2007a, para. 39). In August 2005 the company,
that was not officially registered, started advertising jobs for Ecuadorians and
Colombians in Iraq (de Pérez, 2007a, para. 33)8. The owner of Epi Security and
Investigations was a US national who had worked from 2004 until May 2005
at Manta for DynCorp as a fireman, driver and operator (ibid.). The airport
at Manta was used for civil and military purposes and hosted part of the US
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). It formed the base from which the US
army and private actors operated anti-drug trafficking activities. The ten year
contract between the US and Ecuador had not been renewed in 2009. During
the time of the report, Manta was still an important US military hub with sig-
nificant PMSC involvement (mainly DynCorp), who also employ Ecuadorians.
While the PMSC presence at Manta may have facilitated contacts, there are
no reports about one of the major companies to be involved in recruitment
(de Pérez, 2007a, para. 41)9.
8 The actual number of Ecuadorians recruited for Iraq is hard to establish. The UN Working
Group on Mercenaries talked about a total of 1.000 people that went to Iraq and Afghanistan
(de Pérez, 2007a, pa. 33).
9 Even though DynCorp was also a major security contractor to the Department of Defense in
Iraq. This may have been due to the fact that DynCorp mainly provides base support and only
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Apart from the Ecuadorian case, the case of Peruvian recruitment also con-
tains links to Chile. The UN Working Group on Mercenaries reported about
one company that was not officially registered, but allegedly send 200 Peru-
vians via Chile to Iraq (del Prado, 2008c, para. 22). As far as the formally
documented recruitment connections to Chile are visible; an example presents
the case of Defion International. This company was an intermediary recruit-
ing contractors for Triple Canopy, which as of 2007 had hired 1.130 Peruvians
for work in Iraq. Among the executives of Defion was Juan Manuel Durán, a
former Triple Canopy employee who had been to Iraq and had prior to his re-
cruitment activities in Peru worked in Chile and Honduras (del Prado, 2008c,
para. 21).
The regional entanglements described above are particular to the Latin Amer-
ican recruitment of security contractors for Iraq. As indicated in these cases
Chile or actors with ties to the country seem to have functioned as a sort of
’first mover’ and formed the centre node in this network. Pizarro had close re-
lations to the Chilean Oscar Aspe, who was involved in the Honduran recruit-
ment. In Ecuador, Chileans were also involved in the recruitment and several
Peruvians left for Iraq via Chile. The regional interconnectedness represents
one possible structure of recruitment for Iraq. In contrast to the Ugandan case
where 10.000 to 12.000 individuals have been recruited from this single country,
in Latin America only several hundred people came from each country.
3.2 “military professionalism” and long-established ties to the
us
The main research inquiry of this thesis includes the question as to why a
certain group was recruited. In this section, two possible explanations for the
recruitment of Chileans will be spelled out. For one, the historical-structural
setting and secondly, the military reputation and qualification. The history of
relations between the US and Chile suggests that US companies would hire in
their country’s “backyard” and there have been voices that referred to the spe-
cial military training of Chileans as a reason for their recruitment. The remain-
ing two hypotheses based on economic considerations and political conditions
do not seem suitable here. Clearly it can not be ignored that some Chileans
would also work for lower wages than their US counterparts, but in compar-
ison to the later hired Peruvians they would still seem expensive and rather
engage on an enqual footing. Placing this in relation to the well developed
Chilean economy, a conventional labour migration logic, including unemploy-
ment or a low wage level, seems insufficient. Similarly, seeking the cause for
this preferred recruitment in a particularly liberal legislation regarding private
security activity is futile, considering the necessary legal acrobatics of Pizarro’s
companies described above. In addition, the governing elite neither promoted
the “Coalition of the Willing” nor the recruitment for Iraq (Stoner, 2008). There-
fore the economic and political explanations will be neglected and the other
two hypotheses as well as their explanatory power for the Chilean case will
be spelled out hereafter. At first the specific skills of the Chileans will be de-
1% of its budget accounts for security services, as a company employee pointed out in an email
to me (2014-05-16).
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scribed. These are afterwards, if not traced, at least closely related to the US
influence in Chile and Latin America.
According to Louise Nevaer at least 37 Chilean contractors working in Iraq
had been part of the Pinochet regimes’ enforcement institutions (Nevaer, 2004).
Higate reasons that there maybe a trend towards the recruitment of these in-
dividuals for the conduct of torture, yet he also remarks that these would
need to be men at least in their 50s (Higate, 2012b, 48). Considering that the
Pinochet regime ended or at least changed with the plebiscite in 1988, some
16 years had past before the first Chileans were recruited to Iraq. Still, when
considering Pinochet’s legacy and his position as chief of the military until
his retirement in 1998, the time span until recruitment is shortened to a mere
6 years. This closely resembles the short time it took the South African Eben
Barlow to set up a flourishing export of specialised former Apartheid military
elite personnel via the company Executive Outcomes to Sierra Leone (1995)
and Angola (1992)10 (Reno, 1997). In both cases, it can be reasoned that the
regime change set free a number of highly skilled people that were active in
counter-insurgency, but no longer maintainable for the respective new demo-
cratic regimes.
The people formerly active in the Pinochet regime and partly even those
still on active duty later were trained to serve in the enforcement wing of a re-
pressive regime and thus acquired specialised expertise. They were also able to
maintain some sort of leverage within the democratising Chile, just as Pinochet
himself was granted a rather honourable path to retirement (Spooner, 2011).
He had left behind a Chilean military with a high level in counter-insurgency
expertise and logistics. Pizarro had visited the Blackwater headquarters in 2003
and was fascinated by the concept and inner workings of the private company.
He saw a chance to use the Chilean military potential (Scahill, 2011, 196). Later
Pizarro presented in “castings” the “military preparedness” and “professional-
ism” of the Chilean recruits to a Blackwater delegation before a larger recruit-
ment contract was tied up. The “casting” must have proceeded in a satisfying
way, since directly thereafter one year multiple entry visas were acquired form
the Chilean US Embassy to allow the recruits to “attend meetings at Blackwa-
ter in Moyock, North Carolina” (del Prado, 2008a, para. 15). Gary Jackson, the
Blackwater president put it this way: “We scour[ed] the end of the earth to find
professionals - the Chilean commandos are very, very professional and they fit
within the Blackwater system” (in Franklin, 2004). Some observers reason that
the characteristics that led Blackwater to hire the Chilean recruits are in par-
ticular their experiences in counter-insurgency and torture that still emanated
from the Pinochet era (Stoner, 2008).
The use of the attribute “professional” seems peculiar here. In a 2006 article
Rebecca Gordon wrote about the Georgia-based “School of Americas”:
Under the guise of military and police “professionalization” as well
as training in the protection of human rights, more than 60,000
members of Latin American military and police forces have studied
the techniques of counterinsurgency and torture for half a century.
(emphasis added) (Gordon, 2006, 449)
10 Though it must be noted that Barlow had already started developing Executive Outcomes in
1989 when it became more and more apparent that the Apartheid regime was disintegrating.
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The School of Americas, renamed in 2001 as the Western Hemisphere Institute
for Security Cooperation (WHISC), has been a US institution to train Latin
American police and military personnel since 1946. It has repeatedly been as-
sociated with providing education in torture methods as well (ibid.). The term
“professionalism” was also invoked by Augusto Pinochet when describing the
Chilean military under his rule and how it successfully defended the country
against the ’communist threat’ of that time:
An organized paramilitary force existed in our country and it was
defeated by the professionalism and efficiency of the Armed Forces,
which could not be infiltrated. (emphasis added) (in Henderson,
2000, 441)
While the ascription “professionalism” is probably one claimed by many mil-
itary and para military actors to distinguish themselves from negative conno-
tations, in the context of this thesis, it has certainly occurred extensively in
regard to the Chileans. In this case an explanation based on military qualifica-
tions and reputation is particularly suitable.
In this sense, the Chileans’ military reputation cannot be entirely separated
from Chile’s historical relationship to the US. The US and Chilean military had
already been close before Pinochet came to power. The politics of Salvador Al-
lende had been very much disliked by important actors in both institutions.
Eventually the Chilean military, backed by the US and supported by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA), ended the Presidency of Allende with a coup
d’état (Livingstone, 2009). With typical Cold War reasoning and fear of a pos-
sible “domino-effect”, the administration under US President Richard Nixon
feared the Allende government would be a haven for Communist activity in
Latin America (in Henderson, 2000, 442). Under the Pinochet regime Chile
was framed as a “bastion of the free World ’against the international commu-
nist threat” (in Henderson, 2000, 447). Despite widespread human rights vio-
lations, including forced disappearances and the wide spread use of torture,
the US support of the Pinochet regime continued throughout his rule (Gordon,
2006, 448 f.). According to Gordon, this is no coincidence, but rather a natural
consequence of the US preoccupation with fighting communism regardless of
the cost. Not only Chile, but also “torture regime[s]” throughout Latin Amer-
ica were backed by the US (Gordon, 2006, 449). Pointing to the legacy of the
School of Americas, William Cavanaugh (Cavanaugh, 2006) notes that Chilean
and US torture techniques and styles were very similar and juxtaposes cur-
rent statements about these from the Iraq war with accounts form the Pinochet
time, that are in their materiality disturbingly similar11.
The PMSC recruitment in “America’s backyard” (Livingstone, 2009) seems
unsurprising. Invoking an explanation along the long-established lines of US-
Chilean relations appears reasonable when considering the previously described
backdrop. Also the central figure of the Chilean and Latin American recruit-
ment for Blackwater – Pizzaro – was himself well acquainted with both the US
and Chilean environments.
11 According to Cavanaugh these included “hooding and blindfolding, beating with fists and
hard objects, sexual humiliation, hanging by handcuffs, sleep deprivation, confinement in stress
positions for long periods, and near drowning (called “waterboarding” by US forces and “el
submurino” by Chilean agents)” (Cavanaugh, 2006, 310).
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The particular military reputation and historical ties of Chileans and Latin
Americans were probably only relevant for some recruits. Most Latin American
TCN were tasked with rather ordinary guarding jobs, like the many - later
hired - Peruvians and Colombians that worked for low wages in the industry12.
An interesting remark to a possible further “qualification” though has been
made by Higate (2012b). An informant had told him that personnel from Latin
America could have an advantage in covert operations:
The idea of using ’Latin American men’ who could easily be assim-
ilated into a mid-eastern environment with a little bit of cultural
and language training, with the right clothing and growing of fa-
cial hair ... may also be an asset. (Higate, 2012b, 45)
This racialisation of Latin American male personnel and more implicitly of
Iraqi men recalls postcolonial critique of racialised friend and foe images. Bhat-
tacharyya (Bhattacharyya, 2008) analysed in “Dangerous Brown Men” how in
the “War on Terror” a gendered and racialised threat is constructed, which
traces back to notions of Orientalism and speaking with Spivak “white men
saving brown women from brown men” (in Bahramitash, 2008, 103). The en-
gagement of Latin American contractors would suggest in such a reading
that for reasons of cost effectiveness, now, “brown men” are used to fight the
“dangerous brown men”. A similar racialisation of private contractors will be
shown in the following case study on Fiji, where a discourse on “martial races”
from colonial times seems to still be influencial in the militarisation of Fijian
society.
12 It is still noteworthy that according to a statement by Triple Canopy some US government
customers would explicitly request Latin American personnel (Stoner, 2008).
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CASE STUDY: F I J I
In the previous chapter Chileans were labelled by their potential recruiters
as “professional”. The term referred directly and indirectly to their perceived
and actual expertise in counter-insurgency as well as related interrogation
techniques. The Fijians have, in the context of their recruitment, also been
referred to as “professional”. The connotations, however, are slightly differ-
ent, expressing in this case recognition of their qualities as committed, reliable,
almost loyal and generally “good” soldiers. The Fijian personnel has a well-
established reputation that traces back to British colonialism, where they were
regarded to be a “martial race”. Today it is mostly rooted in their contribu-
tions to the UN peacekeeping troops. While Fijians were also recruited early
on in the private sector expansion in Iraq, their salaries were often lower than
those of the Chileans, making them an economic source for security personnel.
Even though the Fijian recruitment has been associated and was linked to the
Australian involvement in Iraq and security personnel has also been recruited
from other countries in the region, a regional entanglement as seen before
in the case of Chile is absent here. In the following section the recruitment
situation of Fijians will be depicted, first in general then followed by a more
thorough analysis of their military reputation, dating back to its precolonial
beginnings.
4.1 british and anglophone recruitment in the pacific
As described by an US industry insider Fijians were also recruited early, like
the Chileans. The geographic proximity to Australia, which was part of the
“Coalition of the Willing” brought them in through their companies. In ad-
dition, British companies also recruited in Fiji, a country that is traditionally
supplying people to the British Military. The reports about Fijian security per-
sonnel in Iraq are from as early as 2003 and their fragmented nature makes
it hard to determine when the substantial recruitment started. The UN Work-
ing Group on Mercenaries reported for 2005 and 2006 there were just over 800
Fijians working in Iraq and Kuwait (del Prado, 2008b, para. 19, 20), while Nic
Maclellan talked in his 2006 article “From Fiji to Fallujah” of over 1.000 people
in Iraq alone (Maclellan, 2006a, 48). Teresia Teaiwa writes in 2008 about 3.000
Fijians in Iraq and the Middle East (Teaiwa, 2008, 112). As with all the cases
arriving at an exact number is difficult, especially when taking into account
unregistered employment or individual entries to the Iraq labour market.
Large security providers that worked in Iraq, like the British Global Risk
Strategies and Armor Group Services or US-based Triple Canopy, recruited
heavily in Fiji throughout 2005. The local recruitment process was organised
via a company’s local branch or through a local agent as in the case of Armor
Group Services through the Fijian Homeland Security Services Ltd (del Prado,
2008b, para. 19). For Global Risk Strategies, which had a subsidiary of the same
name in Fiji, the influential former military officer Colonel Sakiusa Raivoce
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organised the recruitment in Fiji. In 1996 he had been commander of the Fijian
contingent for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (Maclellan, 2006a,
52).
The UN Working Group on Mercenaries talked to one PMSC employer dur-
ing their visit to Fiji about the company’s requirements for recruitment. The
employer stated that in order to be selected by his company people should have
worked a minimum of three years in the police or military1, be between 23 and
55 years, must prove to not have a criminal record and to pass a medical ex-
amination. According to this employer, training was only conducted once the
recruits arrived in Iraq. There they had a five day training session in which
special attention was given to the handling of an AK 47, which was widely
used by personnel in Iraq (del Prado, 2008b, para. 33)2. The guarding tasks
that Fijians performed included securing “oil fields, installations and govern-
ment buildings” (Maclellan, 2006a, 53) as well as personal security details like
the protection of diplomats (del Prado, 2008b, para. 48).
The Fijian government was largely in favour of the recruitment activities
since they provided much needed employment and consequent income. Fiji’s
economy depends generally on the remittances of citizens working overseas
in all sorts of sectors. This stream of income has outnumbered other revenue
generating sectors like sugar and garment manufacturing (Maclellan, 2006a,
50). The money earned by private security contractors abroad amounts on its
own already to a major source that is only exceeded by the tourism industry
(worth 2 Billion US Dollar) and the sugar industry (with 6 Billion US Dollar)
(del Prado, 2008b, para. 46). Evidently the Fijian government welcomed the
private security labour export, leaving the companies to operate freely. While
there had been voices of concern over potential labour rights violations, the
government appeared neither willing nor capable of regulating the recruitment.
The labour migration for security work abroad was regarded a private matter
of individuals that were free to work for the various companies in their private
capacity (del Prado, 2008b, para. 17-30). As Joji Kotobalavu, Chief Executive in
the Prime Minister’s Office put it in Islands Business magazine in 2004:
We all know about the war in Iraq and [the] risks associated with
the job, so it’s an individual’s choice. The government cannot stop
anyone because they are exercising their constitutional right and
freedom to travel and work anywhere. (in Maclellan, 2006a, 51)
One year later, at the beginning of 2005, the Minister for Labour at that time
Kenneth Zinck pointed to the importance of this labour export for the employ-
ment rates:
[T]he government knows that more men are leaving for Kuwait and
Iraq and it is a good thing, because it is providing employment for
1 The company Homeland Security Limited aledgedly also sought ex-personnel from the prison
service (del Prado, 2008b, para. 31).
2 Similiar to the Chilean case, in the report on Fiji the Working Group on Mercenaries also gave
special attention to the type of training received by the recruits and the sort of weapons handled.
In light of its purpose to look into the potential conduct of mercenary activities, it is under-
standable that the Working Group closely monitors this and expresses concern when it finds
the guarding tasks resemble combat character. But this is inevitable when guarding and even
performing non-combat duties in a combat zone like Iraq.
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the unemployed. This is one solution to the increasing unemploy-
ment rate in the country today. (ibid.)
In such a politically conducive environment it is not surprising that even when
the fraudulent behaviour of Meridan Services, which recruited security per-
sonnel for Public Warehousing Co. in Kuwait, became apparent the authorit-
ies only expressed that it was a “particularly disappointing case” (del Prado,
2008b, para. 23). The company had claimed to be able to provide 15.000 to
20.000 jobs and had requested a recruitment fee of 150 Fijian Dollars3 per in-
dividual (ibid.). About 20.000 Fijians had payed this fee to the company, even
though there were only 2.000 jobs available (Maclellan, 2006b, 144)4. Eventually,
only 400 Fijians were sent to work in the Middle East with only half of them
being formally employed (del Prado, 2008b, para. 23). The deficient capacities
for monitoring or regulating the sector are particularly visible here. According
to the Police Commissioner at the time, this case was not subject to criminal in-
vestigation since it just represented fraudulent behaviour, but was effectively a
private matter (del Prado, 2008b, para. 24). While Meridians’ contractor Public
Warehousing Co. recruited for Kuwait and in this instant is strictly speaking
not immediately relevant for the discussion of the Iraq recruitment case, it
nevertheless illustrates nicely the attitude of the Fijian authorities towards the
employment and potential irregularities5. One former Labour Minster payed
a visit to the PMSC’s headquarters in the US and UK. Even though he urged
for proper insurance for the recruits, more importantly he went to “ensure
that employment could continue [and] increase numbers” (del Prado, 2008b,
para. 27). Towards the UN Working Group he expressed appreciation for bet-
ter oversight, but - in light of the country’s unemployment - being to restrictive
could drive the valued potential employers to other countries like neighbour-
ing Tonga or Nepal (ibid.). Furthermore the Working Group had been told that
three ex-Ministers were heading PMSCs and expressed worry about a poten-
tial “revolving-door” effect, when the public and private sector interacted in
such a manner (del Prado, 2008b, para. 29).
In the same way that many in the government found the recruitment un-
problematic, some recruits themselves also argued there was no reason for
concern:
I must reassure all of you that there is nothing to worry about and
that we feel safe and happy. We are all armed, that includes every-
one working for the security firm, as well as the church pastor. (in
Maclellan, 2006a, 50).
This quote from a message that a Fijian guard sent home certainly has to be
seen in a context of care for the family and an attempt to reassure them, how-
ever it does indeed reflect a trained individual feeling secure in their capacity.
3 This corresponds to 81,70 US Dollar (2014-06-24).
4 The UN Working Group on Mercenaries even claims in its report that this practice earned Me-
ridian 5 Million Fijian Dollar (2.7 Million US Dollar), which would equate to 33.333 applicants;
an information the group was provided with by the former Minister of Labour (during their
May 2007 visit to the country) (del Prado, 2008b, para. 23). Unfortunately, it was not possible to
confirm this information via a second source.
5 Judging from the report of the UN Working Group, the impression arises that fraud and irregu-
lar recruitment are mostly linked to the activities of the Kuwait based companies. While for the
UK and US based companies the contracts and employment actually materialised.
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Despite the dangers associated with work in Iraq, people went in search of
income. Fiji has a large number of militarily trained individuals willing to mi-
grate for work, even to Iraq. Especially for the impoverished rural population
this was very tempting (del Prado, 2008b, para. 30). Often not only individu-
als and their families, but eventually the local communities would depend on
these remittances (del Prado, 2008b, para. 46). Fraudulent recruitment offers
like the above mentioned case of Meridan were therefore particularly devast-
ating for individuals from the rural areas. They often had to borrow money
from the family or community to even apply and obtain necessities like cloth-
ing and passports (del Prado, 2008b, para. 23). Similarly devastating are the
cases where people were recruited to go to Iraq, but did not find employment
there or eventually had to sign contracts for much lower wages then previously
agreed upon. This led the individuals into a dire dependence where returning
to Fiji was impossible due to a lack in financial means, but also since previously
borrowed money had to be earned. When people did manage to find a proper
employer the earned money was a welcome source of income for the families
that would receive the remittances. The security work in the war zone of Iraq
would come with an increased risk of mortality, but also a corresponding life
insurance. In the face of unemployment and deprivation, this sinister mixture
invites morbid humour: “In Suva, local wits jokingly encourage relatives to go
and get killed for the good of the family.” (Maclellan, 2006a, 55).
The ambivalent situation of tempting income and possible exploitation in
which Fijians left for security work in Iraq affected the local military, the Re-
public of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF). The good military reputation making it a
proud supplier of internationally valued soldiers to peacekeeping and (mostly
British) foreign armies was feared to be compromised through the security
work ex-RFMF personnel conducted in Iraq, since it had the connotation of
mercenarism (del Prado, 2008b, para. 17). At the same time Fijian personnel
continued to be welcome in various security providing institutions from UN
peacekeeping units to the armies of neighbouring New Zealand and Australia
as well as security companies contracted in Iraq. This high demand, especially
by the later, presented a big challenge to the RFMF, since it could not compete
with the wages offered by these companies, leading to a drain of qualified
people from the small island army (Maclellan, 2006a, 52)6. Somewhat contra-
dictory, Paul Higate points to the mechanism of a close interconnectedness
between private companies and the Fijian Forces, where military personnel of
all ranks has government approval to work for PMSCs, which subsequently
pay a fee to the military (Higate, 2012b, 42). It is probable that both dynamics
shaped the situation of the Fijian army.
4.2 “disciplined” and “reliable” since colonial times
The recruitment of Fijians for private security work in Iraq was clearly stimu-
lated by the wage discrepancies between the local low income industry and the
comparatively high paying private security industry. The Fijian labour market
cannot accommodate enough people, so high unemployment rates are a major
6 Interestingly, in this context Maclellan noted that the UN also could not offer a wage level
competitive to that of the private sector in Iraq. This presumably also influenced some people’s
decision to choose the private sector over this usually high valued employment opportunity.
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governmental concern. This situation resembles the dynamics described in the
purely economic theory for migration as driven by “push” and “pull” factors.
As described in chapter 2, “push” factors that encourage people to find work
elsewhere are low wage levels and unemployment in their home countries. The
respective “pull” factors consist of better wages and employment possibilities
in the economy that people migrate to. In the Fijian recruitment, the govern-
ment, that has to answer people’s demands for employment and prosperity,
openly welcomed the activities of foreign and domestic private security com-
panies as providers of potential jobs. Therefore the economic reasons that en-
couraged Fijians to go to work in Iraq and vice versa to be hired - since they
were a comparatively cheap source of labour - influenced the political and legal
sphere to not intervene and hamper this labour movement.
In the following I will turn to the remaining two hypotheses, which argues
from the realm of craft or skill while based on the assumption of historical-
structural conditionality. First I will depict the debate surrounding the partic-
ular characteristics that qualify Fijians for security work, then connect these
in a second step to the historical predecessors of the Fijian military reputa-
tion. This will serve to explain the particular demand for Fijians beyond an
economic wage based argument.
In the conclusion of the 2008 report by the UN Working Group on mercen-
arism the authors acknowledge:
[...] that Fiji has an established tradition of well-trained, disciplined
and highly skilled military and security personnel who perform
security functions in various capacities worldwide. Several inter-
locutors confirmed their experiences that Fijians are reliable in hot
spots and are very professional, stress-resistant and appreciated col-
leagues. (del Prado, 2008b, para. 46)
These “various capacities” include serving in the British and US Army. At the
turn of the century the British military went back to their former recruiting
hubs for colonial soldiers in search of volunteers for their army that could
not be found from within the country. Since the end of conscription in 1960
recruitment had been difficult, but with the engagement in the unpopular late
Iraq War and a deteriorating standard of living and working conditions, even
less British citizens were willing to join the ranks. In 1998 it had been decided
that Commonwealth citizens could also join the British army (Ware, 2012, 3
f.). The need for personnel went so far that even British military recruiters
visited Fiji to conduct basic tests for the selection of potential soldiers in order
to reduce the financial burden of those most willing, yet often unable to travel
to London - Fijians from the poor rural areas (Maclellan, 2006a, 58).
The long tradition of Fijians serving for or with the British goes back to the
Second World War and the fight against the Japanese, but includes later activit-
ies in Malaya, Borneo and Oman. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
noted in 2004: “Some observers say their physical robustness and boundless
bravery echoes the famous Gurkhas. But Fijian troops do not enjoy the high
profile of their Nepalese counterparts.” (BBC, 2004). In the same news item,
a senior defence analyst remarks that “[t]hey make very, very good infantry
soldiers.” (ibid.). In these comments the perception of Fijian soldiers becomes
apparent, in contrast to the highly trained Chilean specialist they are rather cat-
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egorised as “infantry soldiers”, foot soldiers. Even compared to the Gurkhas
they seem to be only secondary, yet eager to serve in these capacities.
This eagerness can be attributed to Fijian dependence on remittances and the
income7 that this “warrior diaspora” generates. Higate framed this as Fijians
striking an “ethnic bargain” when individually using the “commodification
of ’martial skills”’ and “the global resonance of Fijian ’warrior culture”’ (Hig-
ate, 2012b) that they are associated with in a global “market for force” (Avant,
2005). This predisposition towards military service that Fijian culture is associ-
ated with was internationally promoted through British colonialism, but has its
root in precolonial times. According to Subhasish Ray the reputation of Fijians
as a “martial race” has to be attributed to British colonial rule, yet “[t]he in-
digenous Fijian community, which had been overrepresented in Fiji’s security
forces under colonial rule, had a precolonial warrior tradition [...]” (Ray, 2012,
562)8. While Ray argues that military fitness on ethnic grounds is predomin-
antly a colonial construct9, he admits in this case to a prior given tendency that
was reinforced under colonial rule.
Teresia Teaiwa refrains from the term “warrior culture” and rather directly
refers to a pervasive militarism in all areas of Fijian society. This “militar-
ism is also understood as something that is made as well as co-consturcted”
(Teaiwa, 2005, 203). She refers to various aspects that influenced this develop-
ment, pointing to militaristic terminology in language (ibid.) and an intimate
link between religion, the military as well as the system of chiefly hierarchy
(Teaiwa, 2005, 211). The later is captured by the idea of turagaism which Teaiwa
summarises as “a belief in chiefly rights to leadership” (Teaiwa, 2005, 203). This
system is interlinked with Fijian Christianity, called lotu. Fiji’s national motto
illustrates this clearly: “Fear God, respect the chief” (Teaiwa, 2005, 211). These
two guiding principles of Fijian society provide orientation and legitimacy in
the military realm as well. The interconnectedness of precolonial structures,
religious beliefs and gender norms contributed to a strong appreciation of
“militarized and masculinized discipline” (Teaiwa, 2005, 206). This is being en-
shrined in individuals in their early years through the boy scouts and resonates
furthermore in the Fijian rugby player’s reputation (Teaiwa, 2005, 213)10.
However valued the Fijians are to foreign recruiters, they were the “most
ill-equipped” during their engagement as peacekeepers in the Middle East in
the 1990s (Teaiwa, 2005, 207). Despite their highly regarded skills, “soldiers in
7 However, as the BBC article quoted the Fijian embassy spokesperson: “You have to understand
that Fijians have a strong admiration for the British Royal Family and there is a huge sense of
pride in serving the Crown.” (BBC, 2004).
8 Ray notes this in contrast to Ugandan Nubians that were evidently constructed as a “martial
race” through colonial discourse. This will be discussed further in chapter 5 on the Ugandan
case.
9 This is nicely illustrated by the recruitment of Punjabi under colonial rule in India. During
the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857 they had remained largely loyal to the British, while people from
the local catchment areas had rebelled. After this, British colonial army recruitment favoured
those proven to be loyal, which created martial groups through heightened training among
these groups while underdeveloping martial skills in other groups (Ray, 2012, 563 f.). This
constructivist approach shows the historical aspects behind the emergence of particular groups
prone to military service and how precolonial and colonial dynamics were influential to this.
10 The immense source of pride and identity the Fijian society generates from their rugby player’s
reputation is examined in Kanemasu and Molnar (2012): Pride of the people: Fijian rugby labour
migration and collective identity.
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Fiji are not highly paid, do not have the best working conditions and have few
employment alternatives” (Teaiwa, 2008, 115). Teaiwa refers at a later point
in her analysis to the somewhat persistent “mythology [...] around the heroic
selflessness of the early Fijian soldiers” that dates back to the Second World
War (Teaiwa, 2005, 208). It could be reckoned that a tradition of altruism and
self-denying behaviour is obstructive to demands on better working conditions,
since it would conflict with the in- or externally ascribed image of a sacrificing
soldier.
In an article from 2008 Teaiwa relates the persistent militarisation of Fijian
everyday life to the demand of Fijians abroad, which unfolds in relation to the
US driven war in Iraq on three levels: For one, many Fijians are engaged in the
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)11, secondly they are working for the
British army and are thirdly recruited by PMSCs (as discussed above) (Teaiwa,
2008, 111 f.). Fijians facilitate simultaneously the ex-colonial power Britain, the
current hegemon US as well as emerging private actors - that are however in
most cases mutations of the aformentioned states’ armies. The decisive PMSCs
in Iraq could clearly be linked to the US and UK12. They functioned as enablers
for the respective defense departments. From a different perspective, the ’a-
political’ private actors were proxies for the governments on whose behalf they
acted and only recruited personnel on the grounds of the demands created by
these clients. For Fiji, Teaiwa summarised the global reach of the Iraq War and
its initiators like this:
Thus, a relatively small South Pacific nation, with a relatively small
population, and a relatively small standing army, experiences in-
tensified processes of militarization as a result of decisions made
by the president of the United States and the prime minister of
Great Britain in consultation with one another - decisions that pro-
foundly affect international movements of capital, investment, and
labor. (Teaiwa, 2008, 112)
While suggesting a direct causal link between the long-established continuing
militarism in Fijian society and the recurrence of coup d’états in the small Pa-
cific island nation would be invalid, it should be kept in mind that this specific
cultural configuration, which is a product of dynamics going back to preco-
lonial times, nevertheless provided a background for these unconstitutional
changes of government.
In sum, on the basis of the aforementioned components of recruitment it
can be argued that Fijians were recruited due to their economic competitive-
ness in terms of wage level. The government and legal authorities that were
well aware of the country’s dependence on these remittances generating labour
export did not interfere with the activities of foreign PMSCs in Fiji. Concomit-
11 With this engagement the Fijian government signaled its strong commitment to the UN. In
December 2004 RFMF troops were sent in support of the UN Mission, whereas none had con-
tributed to the Coalition Forces (Maclellan, 2006a, 59).
12 Apart from the location of their headquarters (Triple Canopy in Reston, Virginia - close to Wash-
ington; Armor Group Services, based in London) and the nationality of leading staff, companies
have themselves insisted on a national identity. Blackwater’s Eric Prince exclaimed: “We have
Americans working for America, protecting Americans.” (Falconer and Schulman, 2008). And in
a sociological analysis of contractor identities Paul Higate (Higate, 2012a) analysed how British
security personnel distinguishes itself explicitly from their US counterparts.
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ant with this was their international reputation as disciplined and reliable sol-
diers, often through UN peacekeeping activities or through their engagement
in the British army. This reputation thrives from a domestic Fijian militarism
as well as particular images of masculinity that have been rooted in precolo-
nial structures, fostered through British colonial rule and are reproduced in
the contemporary military engagement of Fijian individuals worldwide. Addi-
tionally, it should be noted that Fiji presents a logistic and institutional hub in
the Pacific (Teaiwa, 2008, 113) and facilitates international recruitment through
efficient infrastructure.
Eventually, regarding the Fijian’s perspective, the Iraq recruitment came after
a crucial demobilisation when the UNIFIL engagement in Lebanon ended and
had left many former UN employed peacekeepers jobless. A PMSC employee,
Saula Tuikoro, evaluated the situation in Fiji Live in 2006. He linked the pop-
ularity of the private recruitment to the frustration that many soldiers return-
ing from Lebanon felt when having to take undemanding, comparatively badly
payed jobs in Fiji, like guarding supermarkets. According to him, a large num-
ber from this reserve of Middle East experienced soldiers went to work for
PMSCs in Iraq and Kuwait (in Maclellan, 2006a, 52). As mentioned above,
Sakiusa Raivoce who recruited for Global Risk Strategies in Fiji, had been a
commander in the Fijian UNIFIL engagement in the 1990s (Maclellan, 2006a,
52). This is suggestive of some personnel continuity between the Middle East
UN engagement and later private recruitment. How many individuals with
experiences through UNIFIL actually ended up working for PMSC cannot be
established in this frame - nor can the potential personnel overlap with the UN-
AMI in Iraq. However, this set of circumstances illuminates well the interplay
between the outlined general explanations for the transnational recruitment
and a country specific situation.
5
CASE STUDY: UGANDA
Up to this point the Chilean and Fijian recruitment has been examined. In the
Chilean case, the historical ties to the US and the military reputation were the
main drivers for recruitment. Chileans were neither particularly cheap to em-
ploy, nor was their government actively supporting the labour externalisation.
In comparison to that did the Fijian recruitment rely on a conducive environ-
ment produced by all four aspects: they worked for very low wages, had a
government in favour of recruitment, and had a history of migration with a
military reputation to draw upon. While Fiji did not have particularly close
relations to the US, the historical and military ties to the UK and Australia,
who were important actors in the Iraq war, were equally important.
In this chapter the Ugandan recruitment is in focus. In contrast to the Chilean
case, here the other two influencing factors are highlighted: the economic as-
pect or wage level and a politically conducive environment. In 2005, when the
first Ugandans were recruited to Iraq, the security situation there had been
improved to such an extend that specialised personnel was not needed any
longer and it became more important for the companies to be able to employ
a large number of people as cost effective as possible. Within only one year
Ugandans had come to dominate the TCN private security sector. This pres-
ence of Ugandans in Iraq is puzzling, since the country had neither a particular
history with the US nor a military reputation on an international scale. In the
following I will show how this seemingly arbitrary recruitment unfolded.
5.1 from one ugandan in iraq to 10 .000
Tracing the beginnings of the Ugandan recruitment for Iraq, the Ugandan
newspaper The New Vision1 points to the far reaching influence of one indi-
vidual: Bob Kasango. He was an attorney with Hall & Partners, an influential
office in Kampala. He initiated the labour export by linking the Washington
based security provider Special Operations Consulting - Security Management
Group (SOC-SMG) to the Ugandan security company Askar, that then started
recruiting Ugandans willing to work as security contractors in Iraq (Nyapendi,
2006; Ahimbisibwe, 2005). While being the first to seize the opportunity he
was also the first to withdraw from this potentially lucrative business. In The
Monitor2 he gave as reasons the changed nature of employment:
"Unfortunately for me, I have had to pull out because I have not
managed to secure the pay and guarantees that I sought for my
fellow countrymen," he said. (Esiara, 2005)
Kasango had critised the employment of Ugandans in the less secure red zone,
while he had wanted for his recruits to be employed in the green zone only.
1 The oldest newspaper in Uganda and associated with the government.
2 The Monitor is the second oldest newspaper in Uganda and independent. Both newspapers,
The New Vision and The Monitor are the biggest English reporting newspapers in the country.
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Despite this, further discrepancies between his ideas and those of the employ-
ing security companies in Iraq had emerged:
"We developed irreconcilable differences, in particular the amount
of money to be paid to the recruited persons, the areas of deploy-
ment and the guarantees for security and indemnity in case of any
work related eventuality," Kasango said. (ibid.)
By the time Kasango withdrew from the recruitment Askar had started to
develop into the central recruitment company in Uganda. It was headed by
Kellen Kayonga, Sister in law of General Caleb Akandwanaho or as he is
also called, Salim Saleh the younger brother of president Museveni (Gyezaho,
2006)3. While recruiting and vetting personnel for SOC-SMG, later the com-
pany also supplied personnel to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology
(EODT) (Izama and Natabaalo, 2006; City, 2009).
Another influential recruitment agency was Dreshak Security Solutions the
private security arm of the Dubai based Dreshak Group. The Dreshak Group
was involved in real estate, the food and service industry, which includes the
security sector. Beyond that it delivered maintenance and handy work, and in
addition owned a luxury hotel franchise. A subsidiary of the company dealt
with used parts for the heavy industry and another, Dreshak Aviation offered
a cargo airline that even handled flights for Iraqi Airways between the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iraq. The company started recruiting in Uganda in
July 2005 (Dreshak Group, 2014a,b; Kyamutetera, 2007).
Between these two most important recruitment companies existed an at
times even destructive rivalry. The two companies were accusing each other
of fraud (Allio, 2007; Ahimbisibwe, 2008) and Askar once even claiming to-
wards EODT to be the only authorised recruiter and urged the US partner
to “assist ASKAR [...] in an effort to bring all Ugandan security personnel in
compliance with Ugandan law” (Izama, 2007b).
Besides Askar and Dreshak also smaller Ugandan companies registered with
the government in order to be officially able to recruit. Most of them only se-
cured small contracts with security companies working Iraq and subsequently
send only smaller numbers of people. There were also reports of ghost compan-
ies and other scams to rob people of their money through the collection of fees
for alleged job procurement where employment never occurred. By the end
of 2008 four officially licensed companies had actually send people to work
in Iraq. Gideon’s Men/ Connect Financial Services Ltd. had send about 800
people, Watertight 1.200, Dreshak had deployed over 4.000 Ugandans and As-
kar 5.000. All in all it was believed that roughly 12.000 Ugandans4 had found
their way to Iraq and worked in various security related capacities (Ahimbis-
ibwe, 2008).
While the private sector was flurishing on this business, a controversial polit-
ical debate had accompanied it from the start. At the beginning of the private
security recruitment to Iraq many ministers voiced their concerns about this
3 This matter shows how illusive a perceived division between private and public actors can be,
if the involved individuals simply belong to an elite group of the society.
4 The Ugandan defence attaché contradicted this and rather spoke of 10.000 individuals. In this
thesis, when referring to the total number, approximations based on the sources will be given
since strong reliable data is absent.
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form of labour migration. When in May 2005 the first Ugandans left for kyeyo5
in Iraq many people were outraged. While ministers criticised this labour ex-
port, they were in turn blamed for not doing enough to create employment
that would prevent people from seeking jobs abroad (Ahimbisibwe, 2005). The
parliament was urging the government to investigate the situation (Ocwich,
2005), but Foreign Affairs Minister Sam Kuteesa simply stated that neither
was the government involved in the recruitment, nor did it want to interfere
(Ahimbisibwe, 2005). Eventually a meeting between his office and the recruit-
ment companies was arranged. It included the clarification that people would
only go as private individuals and were themselves responsible for their work-
ing conditions and security in Iraq6.
However, some month later the government did put a halt on the recruit-
ment. The justification was, that “[t]he government is considering the subject
matter, and will evolve an appropriate, open transparent system of recruit-
ment and monitor Ugandans who wish to work abroad [...]“ (Esiara, 2005).
One step in that direction was taken by officially licensing some companies
to recruit security contractors for the work in Iraq. Simultaneously army and
police were trying to prevent active personnel from leaving for the tempting of-
fer of earning more in Iraq (Nyakairu, 2006)7. Since the recruitment lay within
the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, the then mister Mwesigwa
Rukutana, had the core responsibility. Over time fraud and misconduct of the
companies had to be investigated (Mutumba, 2006) as well as the occurrence of
scams and ghost companies (Izama, 2007b). Similar oversight was needed with
regard to the working condition of Ugandans in Iraq, where there had been
reports of abuse and labour rights violations (Olupot, 2007)8. One case in par-
ticular had caused much concern: A Ugandan guard working through Askar
in Iraq had shot himself, after shooting his alledegdly abusive South African
supervisor (Matsiko, 2008)9. The capacities to monitor the working conditions
of Ugandans in Iraq were poor. The respective special division had only one
employee and a limited budget (Izama, 2007a). In that context at several times
the Ugandan authorities put a temporary halt on official recruitment (Izama,
2007b).
The labour export to Iraq was very lucrative for the Ugandan government.
In 2011 labour minister Mwesigwa Rukutana said that it earned the country 90
million US Dollar per year, while the traditional main export of coffee brings
only 60 to 70 million US Dollar (Businge, 2011). Besides the revenue; Ugandan
security contractors would account for large remittances flows and many of
them used their earned savings10 back in Uganda to open up small businesses,
5 The term “kyeyo” refers in Uganda to the casual work people find abroad.
6 This is similar to the contract conditions seen before in the Chilean and Fijian cases.
7 Apparently, some companies demanded that before deployment their recruits had to be cleared
by the local authorities, in order to ensure that no active personnel was leaving illegally for Iraq.
8 The Ugandan contractor I interviewed spoke in contrast about casual almost collegial interac-
tion with superiors during meals and after work exercise at the gym.
9 The industry insider had mentioned that South Africans had been thought to make good super-
visors for Ugandans in Iraq, since both groups came from Africa, yet also recalled that this did
not work out very well. It was however not explicitely refered to this case.
10 ’Saving money’ was facilitated by the payment conditions of the companies. They transfered
the monthly wage to an account that was only accessible to the contracors upon their return.
While being in Iraq, they received a monthly allows of 100 Dollar (Matsiko, 2006). This practice
was also alluded to by the Ugandan TCN during the interview.
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thus creating tax relevant employment for themselves and at times even oth-
ers11. Due to the dire unemployment situation the government was very de-
pendent on these job opportunities. Labour, Gender and Social Development
Minister Zoe Bakoko Bakoru was quoted in the local newspaper, saying that:
"The overall goal is to ensure legal, safe and humane externalisa-
tion of our excess labour and maximise remittance inflows," [...]
countries like the Philippines earn millions of dollars by export-
ing its labour abroad. "The challenge should be for us [Uganda] to
train more people and send them to where the skills are needed,"
(Nyanzi, 2006)
With a further improving security situation and a higher demand for these
comparatively well payed jobs by people from low income countries, wages
decreased. In August 2008 the Ugandan government authorised a very dis-
puted wage reduction, from 1.300 to 600 US Dollar per month, which was
legitimated with changing conditions (Mugerwa and Amoru, 2008). Influen-
tial may have been as well the fear of loosing these lucrative labour export jobs
to neighbouring Kenya (Ahimbisibwe, 2008)12.
Kenya and Uganda belonged to the few African countries that were part of
the “Coalition of the Willing”13. Kenya was already a US ally during the Cold
War and remains close to the US, since 9/11 especially with respect to the “War
on Terror”14 (Bachmann, 2004). Uganda on the other hand had a troubled re-
lationship with the US before Museveni came to power in 1986. Already early
into the rule of Idi Amin in 1973, the US had closed its embassy in Uganda
following a rise in anti-American sentiment as well as the expulsion of Israeli,
Asian and British communities (Office of the Historian, 2013; Mamdani, 2011).
The relations to Uganda under Museveni were less troubled. Even though hu-
man rights concerns remain a problem, evidently so since Uganda implemen-
ted its controversial homophobic legislation, the country has received much
praise for its economic transformation into “a thriving liberal capitalist eco-
nomy” (Kuteesa et al., 2010, 3). After 9/11 the US government started a severe
rhetoric of a “Global War on Terror” and started transforming its foreign policy
and development agenda accordingly. Uganda was very receptive to this dis-
11 Different ways the Iraq contractors used their money after returning to Uganda included buying
life stock, building houses, marrying (e.g. paying the pride wealth) or investing in education.
And at least one Iraq returnee set up a private security company himself (Mmali, 2009).
12 This fear of competion from neighbouring countries has also been observed in Fiji regarding
Tonga.
13 As of 18th March 2003 only Eritrea and Ethiopia were willing to participate (Schifferes, 2003a).
Uganda and Rwanda joined three days later (Schifferes, 2003b). Eventually also Kenya and
Angola were on the list that is presented through the George W. Bush White House Online
Archive, dated 27th March 2003 (The White House. President George W. Bush. Archive, 2014).
This full list of coalition members is attached in the Appendix. However, this list has been
criticised for not being time sensitive to the different stages when countries joint, distorting the
actual smaller size of the coalition members in March 2003 (Kravitz, 2008).
14 Without going into a detailed account of the various meanings of “terror” and “terrorism” for
different governments, it should be noted, that in the African context the term “terror” is used
by the US to refer to Islamist or specifically Al-Qaida linked terror that is sought to persist in the
greater Saharan area of North-West Africa and in the East African region, mainly channelled
through Somalia, where Al-Shabaab (Al-Qaida linked) operates. The African “partners” largely
share this view, while extending it to domestic rebel groups that are not necessarily linked to
Islam, e.g. the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, with a Christian affiliation.
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course and is using the anti-terror rhetoric and legislation against domestic
opponents, ranging from opposition leaders to the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA). Regarding the LRA, the Ugandan army received military advice and
assistance from the US since 2011 in order to find and arrest the group’s infam-
ous leader Joseph Kony (Cooper, 2014).
5.2 with a low level of training high in demand
The late relations between the US and Uganda have been mutually beneficial.
The ’superpower’ US had a reliable local partner in its “War on Terror” in the
region Africa. Uganda as an ambitious regional power is receiving welcome
support for domestic economic development and against internal threats. This
alliance only developed during the 1990s under Museveni. In the light of the
troubled relationship between the US and Uganda prior to that it can not be
said that there were particular historical preconditions that made Uganda the
ideal recruitment ground. While it has been a regional labour exporting coun-
try15, large scale international foreign recruitment for military service as seen
in the case of Fiji has no tradition in Uganda. The rule of Idi Amin had a very
disruptive impact on the country’s relations to the UK, especially after his ex-
pulsion of the Asian population in the country - most of them British passport
holders (Mamdani, 2011). Due to the rupture that the Amin years caused for
Uganda’s relations to the US and the UK a historical-structural explanation in
the narrow sense of a continuity of close ties between “core” and “periphery”
countries is not useful in this case. Indeed Ugandas current association with
the US does have a rich history. It could be argued to have a background in
“world-systems” structure. I will in turn rather emphasise the comntempor-
ary quality of these relations, thus framing it under an explanation based on
ongoing foreign poilitcs.
The currently good relations between Uganda and the US may have influ-
enced the politically conducive environment16. The common interests in regard
to the “War on Terror” have facilitated Uganda’s joining the “Coalition of the
Willing”17. This resonates with an environment that is generally open to for-
eign military engagement, examplified by Uganda’s active participation in the
African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) or the UN Stabilization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)18. Apart from shared
ideological believes, Uganda’s economy profited from the labour export and
in light of unemployment rates the government had very immediate reasons
to facilitate recruitment.
The jobs in Iraq provided a valuable source of income for many people,
on an individual level. “Kyeyo” was very popular, especially in the beginning
15 The Ugandan attaché pointed to many Ugandans working in neighbouring countries that were
and that were highly regarded for their training as nurses, teachers and doctors.
16 Though it would be interesting to examine how Uganda’s current anti-gay politics are influen-
cing this. From the US legacy one would expect that “minor” human rights concerns like this
should not overshadow the larger foreign policy project of the “War on Terror”. Even though
US rhetoric has changed under President Obama, the underlying political-military machinery
is still in place.
17 Yet economic dependence is a factor that should not be neglected.
18 The Ugandan military attaché framed this in a broader sentiment of regional and global broth-
erhood, with Ugandans willing to help where needed.
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when wages were still comparatively high. In comparison to prior employed
TCNs like Chileans, Ugandans were a much cheaper alternative for the security
companies and therefore in high demand. With a stabilising situation in Iraq
the required level of training for static security positions was so minimal that
no prior military or service experience was needed19. Recruits from Uganda
were even High School graduates that simply underwent a four to six month
training prior to departure to Iraq (Mmali, 2009)20. The only requirement apart
form an aceptance of low wages was a good English language proficiency. Over
the course of the Iraq engagement the US government had introduced stricter
language requirements for the recruitment of TCNs. It became more important
for TCNs to have a good level of English. The adequate language qualifications
of East Africans – Ugandans (and later Kenyans) in particular - together with
their low wage costs created a high demand for this group of recruits21.
While Uganda is notorious for its peacekeeping activity within the region
(e.g. AMISOM, MONUSCO) this is little known beyond Africa and the mil-
itary is rather regarded as poorly trained22. A legacy as a “martial race” as
seen in the case of Fiji had no relevance to the private security recruitment in
Uganda. Even though the British regarded some groups in today’s territory of
Uganda as “martial races” (Ray, 2012), using them for colonial military service,
today this seems largely forgotten. Just as well as the fact that the Germans re-
cruited soldiers for their colonial army from German East Africa in the First
World War (Maß, 2006). Domestic as well as international journalists report-
ing on the Iraq recruitment only linked it to Uganda’s civil war experience
which presumably had left behind a pool of willing and qualified individuals
(Herbert, 2007; Vicky, 2012).
In this case a rather simple economic explanation of migratory push and pull
factors has some value. The economic dependence on the Iraq jobs was a factor.
The government was confronted with from the beginning and has probably
influenced their facilitation of it. Therefore the remaining part of this chapter
will explore the processes that set the vast recruitment activity in motion and
created this unprecedented connection.
As described above Uganda became a recruitment ground largely due to the
engagement of one individual that could facilitate the necessary contacts23. In
the Chilean case also one individual, Pizarro, was influential for the recruit-
ment and was embedded in a particular historical background that made it
little surprising. In the Ugandan case the initiating individual acted in a fa-
vourable, yet not determined environment and set off a dynamic that resulted
19 According to the industry insider this applied also to the mobile security positions that were
longer occupied by “expats”, but were eventually also staffed with Nepalese and Eastern
Europeans.
20 This was also described by the Ugandan contractor, who was part of this group of young and
militarily inexperienced contractors.
21 The industry insider emphasised the relevance of English language proficiency and noted with
regard to mobile security, that when later on Nepalese and Eastern Europeans worked together,
they were able to cooperate despite language issues. From this it seems that a possible language
barrier – though profane – might have had a huge impact on recruitment.
22 This was the assessment of the industry insider.
23 The industry insider as well as the attaché also refer to a key role played by one individual only,
yet both of them did not mention a name. It is unclear, if they were referring to the same person.
For this rather impersonal trace of structures the important insight is the role which all of these
familiar with the case gave to the engagement of a single person.
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in Uganda quickly becoming the most important source of private security
contractors in Iraq.
The workings at stake here are captured tentatively by the concept of chain
migration and to some extend the ’first mover advantage’. The later only takes
effect in the specific situation for Africans working in Iraq. Taking the whole
Iraq recruitment of TCN into account Chileans would claim this position for
Latin America, which is shown by the role they played later in other Latin
American countries regarding recruitment. However in the group of low payed
security contractors that were sought in 2005, the individual Ugandan was
the one to open up the channel to Uganda, respectively Africa which later
included the recruitment of Kenyans. TCN recruitment for Iraq has occured
in many other African countries and has also been reported for Sierra Leone,
Namibia and - though rather as “expats” - South Africa (Christensen, 2013;
IRIN News, 2008; Clarno and Vally, 2005). Yet, only the recruitment in Kenya
can be somewhat correlated to that in Uganda.
The effects of chain migration or as it is more recently called migration net-
works are to some extend applicable here. As discussed in chapter 2 this has
some limitations like the distinction between temporal migration and settle-
ment. Insights regarding the inception and creation of a new migratory rela-
tionship between two places are of interest in the Ugandan case. While migrat-
ory patterns can be caused by a multiplicity of factors, “economic and other
opportunity differentials generally play a major role” (de Haas, 2010, 1589). In
addition de Haas writes:
Structural forces majeures [sic] in the international political economy
such as warfare, colonialism, conquest, occupation and labour re-
cruitment as well as factors such as shared culture, language and
geographical proximity often play a crucial role in the initiation [sic]
of migration processes (Castles and Miller 2009; Massey et al. 1998;
Skeldon 1997). (ibid.)
Shared values between the US and Uganda regarding the “War on Terror”
were probably one of these factors. While the economically and politically
conducive environment in Uganda was in place, all it needed was the initial
movement of a pioneer. In this case the one individual has been important to
facilitate the contact to the US company SOC-SMG. While the decisions of the
pioneer migrant or recruiters may have been somewhat arbitrary, they can set
a process in motion whereby a “migration industry” develops that facilitates
further migration and profits from maintaining it (de Haas, 2010, 1590). As
part of this supportive sector in Ugandan case various recruitment companies
evolved. Eventually, these initial
“deliberate or more ambiguous choices made by pioneer migrants,
labour recruiters or others tend to have a great influence on the
location of choice of subsequent migrants, who tend to follow the
‘beaten track’.” (de Haas, 2010, 1589).
In the Ugandan case this translates to the establishment of a network of com-
panies that facilitated the labour migration of thousands to Iraq. Many Ugandans
simply applied and went through a formalised well established process to
Iraq, after having heard in the newspaper or via word of mouth about the
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potential employment. These “internal dynamics” are part of different “feed-
back mechanisms” that can be endogenous (first-order) or contextual (second-
order). The former could be exemplified by the “migration industry”, while
the later refers to the impact that migration has on broader socio-economic
aspects in the sending and receiving society (de Haas, 2010, 1591). Haas refers
here to potential changes on “inequality, social stratification, economic growth,
entrepreneurship and cultural change.” (ibid.). With regards to entrepreneur-
ship this impact is very visible in Uganda were returning security contractors
form Iraq often invested their money in starting or maintaining businesses.
This accommodates the attitude of a government that seems neither willing
nor able to supply employment and rather promotes entrepreneurship or self-
employment.
The classical and largely uncontested push- and pull mechanisms that are in
place here were just as relevant for the Fijian case, yet it seems that the timing
and conditions in the Ugandan recruitment were met in just the right fashion
as to set of a downright boom of private enlisting24. The just described dy-
namics may explain how Uganda developed into the most prevalent exporter
of TCN based on a favourable environment with the necessary economic and
logistical infrastructure and a suitable wage level and language proficiency.
Another factor needs to be taken into account, besides the already men-
tioned: There are certain broader dynamics in the distributions of networks
that take affect also in migration patterns - the formation of hubs. Thomas Faist
raised the question, “why are there so many migrants out of a few places?”,
while the majority of places releases only few migrants (Faist, 2000, 7). This
is an observation one could also make about the TCN recruitment were most
contractors came from Uganda and Peru while other nationalities were only
represented in much smaller numbers. While migration theory has little con-
tributions to this question beyond an emphasis on meso-level theories, con-
ventional network theory holds that this is a simple matter of how certain
networks develop through preferential attachment (Newman, 2010).
With the recruitment for Iraq, Uganda, a newcomer to this field, has further
developed its private security sector with some Iraq-returnees setting up their
own companies either for recruitment or domestic security facilitation. In sum,
the Ugandan recruitment can be largely described by economic imperatives,
that influenced the political actors to support and facilitate this business. While
the environment was supportive and a certain infrastructure was in place, the
origins of the recruitment are mainly the activities of one individual that set
off the recruitment of thousands.
24 One could speculate, if that was also influenced by a simple quantitative reason, when taking
into account the population seize of Fiji, about 860.000 and Uganda with 35,9 million people.
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After tracing the recruitment of “Chilean professionals”, “reliable Fijians” and
“affordable Ugandans” to Iraq, it should have become apparent that the war
in Iraq, though initiated by the US, had a multi-national dimension far bey-
ond the facade of the “Coalition of the Willing” and its “Multi-National Force
– Iraq”. Simultaneously it can be concluded that while economic imperatives
are dominating the conduct of the private security sector, it is not free from ste-
reotypical images of different national groups within an international military
division of labour.
The point of departure for this thesis was the puzzle presented by the multi-
national composition of Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in the private secur-
ity sector in Iraq. The group that I called ’armed TCNs’, tasked with securing
military bases, embassies and key infrastructure, has been at the centre of this
inquiry. The research question was: How can the national distribution among
armed TCNs in the US-led private security sector in Iraq be explained?
In chapter 2, four hypotheses were developed that could possibly answer
this question. Different factors influencing the recruitment were captured. One
hypothesis emphasised the economic considerations (a) of companies to hire
certain people and those of the individuals going to work in Iraq. Another
hypothesis focused on the political conditions (b), arguing the respective gov-
ernment’s attitude towards the recruitment and war in Iraq could influence
the flow of people. The third hypothesis built on the assumption that the
historical-structural setting (c) played a major role, with TCNs coming from
countries with long-established ties to the US (or the UK). Fourthly, a national
group’s military reputation and qualification (d) was considered, because only
if people were fit or thought to be fit for this work they would be targeted for
recruitment.
Thereafter, the analysis was advanced through three case studies, which
dealt, according to the chronology of recruitment, first with the Chilean (chapter
3) then the Fijian (chapter 4) and eventually the Ugandan (chaper 5) involve-
ment. These chapters were dyadic as the first part depicted in detail how a
national group came to work in Iraq and the second part examined why a
group was recruited and went abroad. In doing so, detailed answers to the
sub-questions were provided and it was shown how a particular group of na-
tionals gained access to the employment opportunities in Iraq and why this
group was recruited, as well as why these people were willing to work there,
respectively.
In all three cases the initiation of the recruitment could be traced back to
a few individuals and companies that started searching for the people in de-
mand by the large security providers in Iraq. Through these corporate channels
people went to work for the private security sector there. Especially in Chile
and Uganda, the security labour externalisation could be traced back to just
one individual. This has been particularly noteworthy for the Ugandan case.
On individual introduced corporate relations which grew into a recruitment of
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more than 10.000 people. These are significantly more than the roughly 1.000
Chileans or 3.000 Fijians.
In the second part of the case study chapters, which gave room to provide
an explanation on why certain people were recruited, the explanatory value of
the different hypotheses for the cases at hand were assessed. From this ana-
lysis, insight was gained showing recruitment in Chile largely occurred due to
the particular military reputation descending from the Pinochet era embedded
in an intimate relationship to the country’s history with the US. In the Fijian
case, all four factors contributed to the security labour export: Fijians had a
solid military reputation, stemming from their UN engagement and military
migration to US and UK armies. In addition, they were prepared to work for
low wages and had a government in support of recruitment due to the income
in remittances and taxes it provided. All of this occurred against a backdrop
of a militarised society that is rooted even in precolonial times and has ever
since maintained close relations to the UK. While in Fiji all four hypotheses
were valid, in Uganda, somewhat contrary to the Chilean case, the two hypo-
theses that had most explanatory value emphasised economic considerations
and conducive political conditions. Ugandans had no international military
reputation prior to recruitment. Their training was rather seen as substandard.
Due to the Idi Amin regime the relations to the US and UK had been disrupted
and were only rebuilt under Museveni throughout the 1990s. Today, however,
the Ugandan government is closely related to the US in the “War on Terror”
and has been favourable also to the private security recruitment. These results
can be summarised in a simplified matrix as depicted table 6.0.1.
Chile Fiji Uganda
economic considerations – X X
political conditions – X X
historical-structural setting X X –
military reputation and qualifications X X –
Table 6.0.1: Hypotheses-case matrix
In sum the social scientific explanation for the national distribution of TCN
in the private security sector in Iraq needs to take different structural factors
into account, such as wage level disparity or historical and current interna-
tional relations. At the same time, revealed from the examination of the cases,
the actions of the involved individuals can have a far-reaching impact if ex-
ecuted at a crucial time and in decisive conditions. The structural background
can make recruitment from certain countries more likely, but in order to ma-
terialise, key actors are necessary. These can create new links not necessarily
connected to historical preconditions. The case of Uganda shows this nicely:
Even though there had been military recruitment in that region in colonial
times and during the First World War, this was largely forgotten and irrelevant
for the current recruitment. While abstract workings can be derived to explain
this movement of people, as shown for Fiji, case specific details can take ef-
fect far beyond this. The coincidental end of the Fijian Lebanon engagement
with UNIFIL, for example, set free a potential workforce for the private secur-
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ity sector in Iraq. At the same time these concrete influences are embedded
in structural preconditions, illustrated by the military history and reputation
of Fijians. The Chilean case showed that even if the political and legal envir-
onment was not conducive to recruitment, the creativity of committed actors
could overcome these structural deficits.
This analysis provides an approach that could facilitate the study of other
national groups involved among TCNs, as well. Immediate examples would
derive from the insight that being part of the “Coalition of the Willing” was
not a necessary prerequisite for private security engagement. This was seen in
Chile and some Latin American countries that were not part of the coalition,
yet had people working in Iraq. One other operational aspect is the language
ability enabling the Ugandan, Kenyan, Sierra Leonean and Namibian recruit-
ment, over that of Africans from Francophone nations.
The transnational recruitment in the private security sector in Iraq is en-
shrined in a context of the commodification of security, which allows the
private industry to act beyond governmental policies. It also represents a spa-
cial condition of the war in Iraq that transcends the actual war theatre pro-
foundly. These are the broader theoretical implications of the transnational
Iraq recruitment for the areas of study related to this thesis.
While the thesis contributed through its detailed empirical examination to
a further understanding of the phenomenon of TCN recruitment, it also has
implications for the larger subject of PMSCs. The literature of private secur-
ity and military companies, though growing rapidly, nevertheless often lacks
prudent empirical analysis1, especially with regard to the rather novel group
of actors – the TCNs. Through its empirical contribution, the thesis touches –
materially rooted – on theoretical discussions concerning the field of Global
Studies. It goes beyond classical international relations interpretations of the
problem by taking a multi-disciplinary approach, which combines structural-
ist and agentic perspectives. In a frame of comparative area studies, universal
dynamics and particular specifics are balanced. The private security sector in
Iraq was truly global in reach2. While it was framed by the US, an international
array of actors contributed to its constitution. The different dimensions of this
phenomenon: its spacial reach, the flow of people, the commodification of a
former public good, the ambivalent dominance of the US and the active role
and engagement of actors from all areas of the world, all constitute aspects
within Global Studies made tangible here through the topic of transnational
recruitment in Iraq.
The research for the thesis was shaped by a variety of challenges. The sec-
ondary literature available for the cases was very heterogeneous in scope and
quality. While Chile and Fiji had already received academic attention and had
been visited by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries, which provided valu-
able insight, the case of Uganda was gravely understudied. This might be at-
1 This has been lamented by Nicole Deitelhoff, who referred to the phenomenon of private secur-
ity as the current thriller in peace and conflict studies, that though debated with great passion,
is only based on insufficient scientific data (Deitelhoff, 2008, 167).
2 The war could be discussed as a possible “global moment”, modelled after Erez Manela’s un-
derstanding of the “Wilsonian Moment”. With this term he referred to the impact of Wilsonian
rhetoric after the Second World War, that had been appropriated and influenced events in many
parts of the world. Thus this instant in World History reached far beyond its immediate location
(Manela, 2007).
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tributed to the indeed surprising prevalence of this group among TCNs. In Fiji
for example people like Nic Maclellan and Teresia Teaiwa were already study-
ing militarisation and labour movement in the Pacific and could easily react to
the Fijian recruitment to Iraq.
Even more impairing was the inaccessibility of data or its sheer nonexist-
ence. Because no reliable numbers exist as to how many TCNs came from
which countries, the empirical material had to be gathered largely from media
reports3. This information and data deficit can be attributed to the elaborate
network of companies in different service areas involved in the private security
sector in Iraq and was furthered by the industries suspicion towards outsiders,
the war context and the transnational reach of the phenomenon. The unwilling-
ness of individuals in the private security industry to share their knowledge
must be seen in light of the negative media coverage of their activities. In the
end, these challenges are connected to my level of engagement in academia
(Master Thesis), my spacial location (North-Central Europe), and my status as
a civilian, respectively an industry outsider.
Further research would need to address other national cases of TCN recruit-
ment, and if possible other war theatres besides that of Iraq. Despite an ob-
vious plea for more case studies or at least empirical examinations of TCN
recruitment, this research also opened up new areas of inquiry. Thus, detailed
biographic examinations of the key individuals in this transnational network
could further the understanding of how pathways into different countries are
formed. Apart from that there is little knowledge about the role and posi-
tion of women among ’armed TCNs’. Apparently there have been several hun-
dred women employed, most of them from African countries, but also from
Nepal, the Philippines and Eastern European countries. While Filipinas and
Eastern European women worked rather in administrative positions, African
and Nepalese women were mostly employed for guarding tasks, especially for
female body searches at entry checkpoints. Since there was no pool of female
ex-soldiers from the African militaries, these women were often specifically re-
cruited and trained4. Examining the multi-national work places that emerged
in Iraq in terms of cultural contact would also be very interesting, particularly
with a sensitivety to postcolonial divides among the (private) military staff.
Amanda Chisholm (2014) has researched the working conditions of “Gurkhas”
among the TCNs as a subaltern group of men within the private security sec-
tor in Afghanistan. In this sense the identification of TCNs with, or distiction
from, US- and other “expat” contractors could be interrogated, but also their
respective relations to Local Nationals (LNs) and the Iraqi population. The
Ugandan contractor for example mentioned being regarded an Afro-American
rather than recognised as an African TCN. He talked about racism from Iraqis
during body searches at entry points, while wondering himself why “Arabs”
3 In email communication with influential research institutions like the Denver based Private
Security Monitor and authors that had written about TCN involvement in Iraq, like T. Christian
Miller of ProPublica and Hope Metcalf from Yale Law School, I had to learn that even they were
not able to gather a coherent set of data on TCN recruitment, especially with regard to reliable
numbers of how many people came from which countries.
4 These assessment was provided by the industry insider, who also considered the female African
TCNs more professional than their male counterparts.
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were such racist people5. Similarly the knowledge of the so called “intercul-
tural communication” that is produced could be examined, since it has been
invoked as a qualification of Fijian TCNs that had “Middle East experience”.
The war in Iraq has been the crystallisation point – the material ground –
where a transnational phenomenon influenced by dynamics on different scales
unfolded. If and how the private security sector contributed to security and sta-
bilisation in the host country remains open to question. Nevertheless it had a
far reach, influencing also the countries that TCN security contractors were
recruited from. While the multi-nationality of TCNs appeared initially surpris-
ing, a sound analysis of the history and conditions under which it developed,
enabled the normalisation and demystification of a phenomenon that is often
clouded by suspicious secrecy or moral discourse.
5 The interaction of heterogenous groups that took place at military bases in Iraq, could be inter-
rogated as a possible “portal of globalisation”. It could be examined to what extend military
bases of such a multi-national composition could be “entrance points for cultural transfer [...
that develope] institutions and practices for dealing with global connectedness” (Middell and
Naumann, 2010, 162).
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Part I
APPENDIX
A
ADDIT IONAL NOTES
a.1 contractor personnel by type of service provided
15%
58%
9%
8%
7%
1%
2%
Base Support 77,669
Construction 19,941
Other 11,494
Security 10,422
Translator/Interpreter 9,241
Transportation 2,383
Communication 1,460
Figure A.1.1: Iraq DOD Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided.
Source: DOD; US Central Command (USCENTCOM) 2nd Quarterly Contrac-
tor Census Report (as of March 31, 2009) (Schwartz, 2009, 6).
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a.2 list of “coalition of the willing” members
Afghanistan Hungary Portugal
Albania Iceland Romania
Angola Italy Rwanda
Australia Japan Singapore
Azerbaijan Kuwait Slovakia
Bulgaria Latvia Solomon Islands
Colombia Lithuania South Korea
Costa Rica Macedonia Spain
Czech Republic Marshall Islands Tonga
Denmark Micronesia Turkey
Dominican Republic Mongolia Uganda
El Salvador Netherlands Ukraine
Eritrea Nicaragua United Kingdom
Estonia Palau United States
Ethiopia Panama Uzbekistan
Georgia Philippines
Honduras Poland
Table A.2.1: List of coalition members.
Note: List of coalition members as given by the USWhite House Archive, dated
March, 27 2003 (The White House. President George W. Bush. Archive, 2014).
However, see page 38 for the critique by Derek Kravitz (2008) about the time
insensitivity of this list.
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